中国农地改革中的产权细分、权利配置与行为激励  

Property Right Subdivision, Right Allocation and Behavior Incentive in Farmland Reform in China

作　　者：苏常禄[1] SU Changlu

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨商业大学财政与公共管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150028

出　　处：《商业经济》2022年第11期130-132,共3页Business & Economy

基　　金：黑龙江省哲学社会科学研究规划项目:双循环格局下黑龙江省新型城镇化高质量建设研究(21JYC239)。

摘　　要：中国的农地改革过程中不断对农地产权进行细分,然后配置给相应的组织或者农民,而权利的获得或者改变会对相应的当事人产生一定的激励,导致不同的行为。通过对农地改革三个阶段的研究,发现不同的阶段具有不同的产权细分特征,细分出来的农地权利需要进行配置,不同的权利配置会产生不同的激励,农民会表现出不同的行为。农民获得更多的权利有利于增大农地的价值。这些可以解释农地改革的成败。In the process of farmland reform in China, farmland property rights are constantly subdivided and then allocated to the corresponding organizations or farmers. The acquisition or change of rights will generate certain incentives for the corresponding parties and lead to different behaviors. Analyzing the three stages of farmland reform, it is found that different stages have different characteristics of property rights subdivision, and the subdivided farmland rights need to be allocated. Different rights allocation will produce different incentives, and farmers will show different behaviors. More rights for farmers will increase the value of farmland. These may explain the success or failure of farmland reform.

关 键 词：产权细分 权利配置 农地改革 产权安排 行为激励 

分 类 号：F321.1[经济管理—产业经济]