政策组合下电动物流汽车在物流企业中扩散的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Diffusion of Electric Logistics Vehicles in Logistics Enterprisesunder Policy Combination

作　　者：张正浩 陈焰[1] 王艺[1] ZHANG Zhenghao;CHEN Yan;WANG Yi(School of Transportation&Logistics Engineering,Wuhan University of Technology,Wuhan 430063,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉理工大学交通与物流工程学院,湖北武汉430063

出　　处：《物流技术》2022年第10期37-45,共9页Logistics Technology

摘　　要：基于政策组合的视角构建了一个政策组合框架,然后运用演化博弈和仿真实验,对汽车制造商与物流企业在不同政策组合下的稳定性进行分析,探究政策组合对电动物流汽车在汽车制造商和物流企业之间扩散的影响。结果表明:在没有政策跟进的初始阶段,除非有政策干预或结合其他措施,否则电动物流汽车不可能得到有效和迅速的推广;当双方低碳策略的比例各增加到一定程度时,即使没有政府补贴,相关扩散也是有效的;与单一政策相比,政策组合可以有效加速电动物流汽车的扩散。In this paper,by constructing a policy combination framework and using the evolutionary game and simulation method,we analyzed the stability of automobile manufacturers and logistics enterprises under different policy combinations and explored the effect of policy combination on the diffusion of electric logistics vehicles in automobile manufacturers and logistics enterprises.The result showed that:in the initial stage where there is no policy follow-up,except for policy intervention or other supporting measures,electric logistics vehicles cannot be effectively and rapidly popularized;as the low-carbon strategy of the two parties each reaches certain proportion,there will be effective diffusion even in the absence of government subsidies;and compared with a single policy,policy combination can more effectively accelerate the diffusion of electric logistics vehicles.

关 键 词：政策组合 电动物流汽车 物流企业 演化博弈 系统动力学 

分 类 号：F259.23[经济管理—国民经济] F426.47F224.32