董事高管责任险与管理层薪酬黏性  

D&O Insurance and Management Stickiness

作　　者：唐亚军 李成蹊[3] 王靖宇 汪丽 YAJUN TANG;CHENGXI LI;JINGYU WANG;LI WANG

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学会计学院 [2]西藏大学财经学院 [3]北京工商大学商学院,北京市100048

出　　处：《中国会计评论》2021年第3期459-480,共22页China Accounting Review

基　　金：西藏大学校级培育基金项目(ZDCZJH19-08、ZDC-ZJH20-05)的阶段性研究成果。

摘　　要：本文利用2010—2019年上市公司样本,考察上市公司购买董事高管责任险与管理层薪酬黏性之间的关系。研究发现,董事高管责任险可以显著抑制上市公司管理层薪酬黏性,尤其是当两权分离度较高时,董事高管责任险的治理作用更明显。进一步的研究显示,董事高管责任险对制度环境具有依赖性,当公司处于内部控制质量更高或政治监督更严厉的规范化制度环境时,董事高管责任险对管理层薪酬黏性的抑制作用更强。本文丰富了现有关于董事高管责任险的研究,从薪酬黏性角度为董事高管责任险具有良好的治理效应提供了新的证据。This paper mainly studies the external governance mechanism of the company,and uses the sample of listed companies in 2010-2019 to investigate whether the purchase of D&O insurance can significantly inhibit the compensation stickiness of management.The research finds that the D&.O insurance can significantly inhibit the compensation stickiness of the management of listed companies,especially when the separation of the two powers is high,the governance effect of the D&O insurance is more obvious.Further research shows that the D&O insurance has a dependence on the institutional environment.When the company is in a standardized system environment with higher internal control quality or more strict political supervision, the D&O insurance has a stronger inhibition on themanagement compensation stickiness. The conclusion enriches the existing research on theD&.O insurance and provides new evidence for the good governance effect of D&O insurancefrom the perspective of compensation stickiness.

关 键 词：董事高管责任险 薪酬黏性 外部治理 

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