知识传递与认知非正义  

Knowledge Transmission and Epistemic Injustice

作　　者：白惠仁[1] Bai Huiren(School of Philosophy,Zhejiang University,Hangzhou 310058)

机构地区：[1]浙江大学哲学学院,杭州310058

出　　处：《浙江社会科学》2022年第11期86-94,158,共10页Zhejiang Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目“当代科学中的认知非正义问题研究”(项目编号:22CZX026)。

摘　　要：知识传递是人类日常认知实践中重要的知识来源。在知识传递过程中听者自发的非推论式的知识接受包含了相应的批判性判断,该判断依赖听者的感知能力。这种感知能力如同道德感知一样来自于亚里士多德式的社会训练,同时会沿袭因为阶层、性别、种族、国别、宗教等因素所形成的身份偏见。在知识传递中,听者对说者的身份偏见造成了其可信度下降,持续发生的身份偏见消解了部分人的知识身份,从而造成认知非正义。减少这种认知非正义的可能方式是诉诸于包含了认知与伦理维度的认知正义德性,或是诉诸于罗尔斯式的理想的社会基本认知结构。Knowledge transmission is an important knowledge source in daily epistemic practices.In the process of knowledge transmission,the listener’s spontaneous non-inferential knowledge acceptance contains the corresponding critical judgment,which depends on the listener’s perceptual ability.Like moral perception,this kind of perception comes from Aristotelian social training,which come along with the identity prejudice formed by class,gender,race,nationality,religion and other factors.In the process of knowledge transmission,a speaker suffers the epistemic injustice just if prejudice on the hearer’s part causes him to give the speaker less credibility than he would otherwise have given.The possible way to eliminate this epistemic injustice caused by the identity-prejudicial credibility deficit is to appeal to the virtue of epistemic justice which is ethical-intellectual virtue,or appeal to a Rawlsian ideal and well-ordered epistemic basic structure.

关 键 词：知识传递 自然状态 非推论主义 认知非正义 认知正义德性 

分 类 号：B017[哲学宗教—哲学理论] B82-0