股票市场中不完全信息两阶段博弈分析  

Analysis of a two-stage game with incomplete information in stock market

作　　者：许璐 叶咪 Xu Lu;Ye Mi(Nanjing University of Finance&Economics,Nanjing,Jiangsu,210023)

机构地区：[1]南京财经大学,江苏南京210023

出　　处：《市场周刊》2022年第11期105-109,共5页Market Weekly

摘　　要：股票市场中机构投资者与个人投资者之间存在博弈关系,为不完全信息博弈。机构投资者可以和企业联合掩盖部分信息或者向市场发布虚假信息,导致个人投资者根据市场上的不对等信息做出错误解读和错误决策。根据非合作博弈模型在国内股票市场中的应用就机构投资者之间的博弈,进行两阶段的分析。通过机构投资者之间的支付矩阵,分析均衡存在的可能以及其现实意义.There is a game relationship between institutional investors and individual investors in the stock market,as an incomplete information game.Institutional investors can join with companies to cover up some information or release false information to the market,which leads to misinterpretation and wrong decisions by individual investors based on unequal information in the market.According to the application of the non-cooperative game model in the domestic stock market on the game between institutional investors and institutional investors,a two-stage analysis is performed.The possibility of equilibrium existence and its relevance is analyzed through the payment matrix between institutional investors.

关 键 词：机构投资者 个人投资者 不完全信息 支付矩阵 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]