“监督效应”VS“掏空效应”:高管纵向兼任与审计决策  

“Monitoring Effect” VS “Tunneling Effect”:Vertical Interlocks of Executives and Audit Decisions

作　　者：宋衍蘅[1] 毕煜晗 文雯 SONG Yan-heng;BI Yu-han;WEN Wen

机构地区：[1]北京外国语大学国际商学院 [2]北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院

出　　处：《中央财经大学学报》2022年第11期52-64,共13页Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“中国多梯队审计市场竞争格局及其经济后果研究——基于不同会计师事务所竞争策略的比较分析”(项目编号:72072015);国家自然科学基金项目“上市公司精准扶贫行为的同群效应:作用机制与经济后果”(项目编号:72002014);北京外国语大学“双一流”重大(点)标志性项目研究成果“后疫情时期全球化风险研究:金融安全与商务风险视角”(项目编号:2022SYLZD001)。

摘　　要：高管纵向兼任有助于大股东更好地监督上市公司(监督效应),还是更方便给大股东输送利益(掏空效应) 本文采用2004—2018年中国沪深A股上市公司的数据,从审计决策视角探究了高管纵向兼任的经济后果。实证研究发现,高管纵向兼任发挥了“监督效应”:审计师减少了存在高管纵向兼任公司的审计投入、降低了审计费用、更有可能出具标准无保留审计意见。机制检验表明,高管纵向兼任通过提高内部控制质量、降低股东与管理层之间的代理成本发挥了良好的监督效应,进而影响了审计决策。拓展性研究显示,高管纵向兼任对审计决策的影响在大股东控制力较弱样本中更加显著;相比于总经理兼任,董事长纵向兼任对审计决策的影响更强;区分产权性质后发现,高管纵向兼任对审计决策的影响在国有企业中更加显著。本文的研究结果拓展了高管纵向兼任的经济后果和审计决策的影响因素研究,对于完善公司治理体系亦有借鉴意义。Do vertical interlocked executives help controlling shareholders better monitor listed companies(monitoring effect),or it is more convenient to convey benefits to controlling shareholders(tunneling effect) Using the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2004 to 2018,this paper empirically examines the economic consequences of vertical interlocks of executives from the perspective of audit decisions.The results indicate that vertical interlocks of executives play a “monitoring” role from the auditors’ point of view.In detail, auditors reduce audit investment, charge lower audit fees and are more likely to issue clean audit opinions for these firms.Channel tests show that vertical interlocks of executives affect audit decisions by improving internal control quality and reducing agency costs between shareholders and managers.Further analysis shows that the influence of vertical interlocks of executives on audit decisions is more pronounced in companies with fewer large shareholder control rights.Compared with vertical interlocked CEOs, vertical interlocked chairmen have a more significant impact on audit decisions.Distinguishing the nature of property rights, the influence of vertical interlocks of executives on audit decisions is more pronounced in state-owned companies.This paper extends the literature on the economic consequences of vertical interlocks of executives and the determinants of audit decisions, which also have implications for improving corporate governance system.

关 键 词：高管纵向兼任 审计投入 审计收费 审计意见 

分 类 号：F239.0[经济管理—会计学]