信念修正理论视角下的绿蓝悖论  

The Grue Paradox in the Perspective of Belief Revision Theory

作　　者：杜晓柳 Xiaoliu Du(School of Philosophy,Zhejiang University)

机构地区：[1]浙江大学哲学学院

出　　处：《逻辑学研究》2022年第5期13-23,共11页Studies in Logic

摘　　要：AGM信念修正理论是一种刻画主体信念状态及其变动的理论。通过适当的修正和扩充,它也可以用来描述主体进行枚举归纳活动时的信念。绿蓝悖论这一问题中的归纳主体的信念变动情况也可以通过这种修改后的AGM方法进行刻画。尽管这种刻画实际上并没有消除绿蓝悖论,却也提供了一种新的视角解析问题,并清晰明了地呈现出了绿蓝悖论的根源所在。AGM belief revision theory is a theory that portrays the state of an agent’s beliefs and their changes. With appropriate modifications and expansions, it can also be used to describe the beliefs of agents when they engage in enumerative induction activities. The shifting beliefs of the agent in the grue paradox can also be portrayed by this modified AGM theory. Although this portrayal does not directly eliminate the grue paradox as scholars had initially expected, it does provide a new perspective on the problem and presents a clear picture of the root causes of the grue paradox.

关 键 词：AGM理论 绿蓝悖论 枚举归纳 

分 类 号：B81[哲学宗教—逻辑学]