地方政府环境竞争、环境注意力与环境治理效率——基于地级市面板数据的实证研究  

Environmental Competition,Environmental Attention,and Environmental Governance Efficiency of Local Governments:An Empirical Study Based on the Panel Data of Prefecture-level Cities

作　　者：吴建祖[1] 王碧莹 WU Jianzu;WANG Biying(School of Management,Lanzhou University,Lanzhou 730000,China)

机构地区：[1]兰州大学管理学院,甘肃兰州730000

出　　处：《东北大学学报（社会科学版）》2022年第6期33-40,共8页Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71972094);兰州市科技计划资助项目(2022-ZD-109)。

摘　　要：基于晋升锦标赛理论和注意力基础观,以2013—2018年中国293个地级市为样本,运用系统GMM模型实证分析地方政府环境竞争对环境治理效率的影响及其内部机理。研究结果表明:在政绩考核模式转变和晋升锦标赛激励下,地方政府环境竞争越激烈,环境治理效率越高;地方政府环境竞争越激烈,政府环境注意力越高;地方政府环境注意力在地方政府环境竞争对环境治理效率的影响效应中起到完全中介作用。基于此,应继续完善环境绩效考核激励措施,扩大环境绩效考核指标范围,引导地方政府将环境注意力转变为环境治理行动。Using a sample of 293 prefecture-level cities in China from 2013 to 2018 and the system GMM model,we empirically examine the influence of local government competition on environmental governance efficiency and its mechanism based on promotion tournament theory and the attention-based view.The results of the study show that under the change of performance assessment model and promotion tournament incentives,the more intense the local government environmental competition is,the higher the environmental governance efficiency;the more intense the local government environmental competition is,the higher the government environmental attention.The local government environmental attention fully mediates the effect of the local government environmental competition on environmental governance efficiency.For this reason,incentives for environmental performance assessment should continue to be improved,the scope of environmental performance assessment indicators should be expanded,and local governments should be guided to turn their environmental attention into environmental governance actions.

关 键 词：环境治理效率 地方政府 环境竞争 环境注意力 晋升锦标赛 注意力基础观 

分 类 号：C939[经济管理—管理学]