中央一般性转移支付何以影响地方财政支出结构?——基于地方预算软约束分析视角  

How does the Central General Transfer Payment Affect the Fiscal Expenditure Structure?——An Analysis Based on the Local Soft Budget Constraint

作　　者：张启春[1] 苗子豪 Zhang Qichun;Miao Zihao(Institute of China Rural Studies,Central China Normal University,Wuhan 430079;School of Public Administration,Central China Normal University,Wuhan 430079)

机构地区：[1]华中师范大学政治学部中国农村研究院,湖北武汉430079 [2]华中师范大学政治学部公共管理学院,湖北武汉430079

出　　处：《华中师范大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2022年第6期72-86,共15页Journal of Central China Normal University:Humanities and Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目“历史交汇期基本公共服务均等化政策实施效果影响因素及优化方案研究”(19AZZ012)。

摘　　要：中央一般性转移支付会对地方财政行为产生何种影响?通过构建一个包含预算软约束、激励机制与财政竞争等基本因素的理论框架,分析了中央一般性转移支付影响地方财政行为的具体机制并运用多种计量方法进行了实证检验。实证结果表明:第一,中央一般性转移支付会引发地方预算软约束行为,以及产生地方财政层面上预算软约束的竞争效应,目的是获得更多的一般性转移支付;第二,受强经济激励影响,地方政府倾向于将争夺的一般性转移支付增量额支出在生产建设类支出领域,且相较于经济较发达地区,实际获得更多一般性转移支付增量额的经济欠发达地区更容易产生一般性转移支付增量额的支出偏向性配置问题。以上研究结果揭示了现阶段高规模的中央一般性转移支付是地方预算软约束行为“倒逼”产生的后果,且缺少规范的转移支付实施激励,扩大的一般性转移支付规模并不能显著提升地方公共福利类支出水平。What impact will the central general transfer payment have on the local fiscal behavior? Through the construction of a theoretical framework which includes such fundamental elements as soft budget constraint, incentive mechanism and fiscal competition, this paper analyzes the specific mechanism of the ways in which central general transfer payment affects local fiscal behavior, and conducts an empirical test. The test results show that:(1) the central general transfer payment will give rise to the local soft budget constraint behavior and produce competitive effect on soft budget constraint at local fiscal level, in order to obtain more general transfer payment;(2) affected by strong economic incentives, local governments tend to compete for the incremental amount of general transfer payments in the field of production and construction expenditures. Compared with the economically developed regions, the underdeveloped regions that actually obtain more incremental amount of general transfer payments are more likely to encounter the problem of biased allocation of the incremental amount of general transfer payments. The research results reveal that the high scale of central general transfer payments at the present stage is the “forced reversal” resulted from the soft constraint behavior of local budgets, and there is a lack of standardized incentive for the implementation of transfer payments. The expanded scale of general transfer payments cannot significantly improve the level of local public welfare expenditures.

关 键 词：一般性转移支付增量额 预算软约束 基本公共服务均等化 财政支出结构 生产建设类支出 

分 类 号：F812.45[经济管理—财政学]