Intentionality and Temporality in Husserl  

作　　者：Hilaire Tassoulou Ngoma 

机构地区：[1]Marien Ngoubi University,Brazzaville,Congo

出　　处：《Journal of Philosophy Study》2022年第9期488-505,共18页哲学研究（英文版）

摘　　要：This article on intentionality and temporality shows how Husserl remains indebted to Brentano for his conception of time.Since,it is through the Brentanian conception of the intimate consciousness of time that Husserl was able to discover how immanent time and transcendent time are distinguished.The article shows how Husserl,by taking advantage of this distinction between immanent and transcendent time established by Brentano,thought he had discovered time as an object that is within consciousness and not outside it.However,this article makes it clear that Husserl denies the power of the imagination,to which Brentano had recourse,to continually make possible the modifications that arise through the moments of transcendent time.This denial for Husserl shows how Brentano ignored both the intimate consciousness of time and the imagination.Consequently,the article underlines the fact that if for Husserl the intimate consciousness of time discovers time within oneself,the major stake of Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of Husserl consists rather in discovering time in the exteriority to oneself of the consciousness which cannot have a hold on time within oneself.Since it is in the movement that opens the consciousness on itself that time is discovered outside the consciousness and in the consciousness.This is how Merleau-Ponty understands the movement where the consciousness that accomplishes its passage towards itself accomplishes it by the retention that unceasingly opens on the protention.

关 键 词：CONSCIOUSNESS perception RETENTION time 

分 类 号：B08[哲学宗教—哲学理论]