建设工程项目监理与承包商合谋行为博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Collusion Behavior between Construction Project Supervisor and Contractor

作　　者：岳朝龙[1] 梅沭娟 贺龙 YUE Chaolong;MEI Shujuan;HE Long(School of Management Science and Engineering,Anhui University of Technology,Ma’ansha Anhui 243032,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽工业大学管理科学与工程学院,安徽马鞍山243032

出　　处：《科技和产业》2022年第11期148-152,共5页Science Technology and Industry

摘　　要：针对建设工程项目施工阶段的监理与承包商合谋问题,基于博弈论对业主、承包商以及工程监理之间的关系展开分析。考虑业主验收时工程质量水平的高低分别建立惩罚机制和奖惩机制下的三方博弈模型。对均衡结果的比较显示,采用奖惩机制比惩罚机制对抑制合谋行为更有效,且奖惩机制下的博弈均衡结果表明监理和承包商在施工阶段合谋的概率与业主的监督成本成正相关,与业主监督的有效性和对合谋的惩罚力度成负相关,并给出防范合谋的建议。Aiming at the collusion between the supervisor and the contractor in the construction stage of the construction project,the relationship between the owner,the contractor and the project supervisor is analyzed based on the game theory.Considering the level of the project quality during the acceptance of the owner,the tripartite game models under the punishment mechanism and the reward and punishment mechanism are established respectively.The comparison of the equilibrium results shows that the reward and punishment mechanism is more effective than the punishment mechanism in restraining collusion,and the game equilibrium results under the reward and punishment mechanism show that the probability of collusion between the supervisor and the contractor in the construction stage is positively related to the supervision cost of the owner,and negatively related to the effectiveness of the owner’s supervision and the punishment of collusion.The suggestions to prevent collusion are given.

关 键 词：工程质量 寻租 博弈论 激励机制 

分 类 号：F407.9[经济管理—产业经济]