财政分权度与国有企业控制权配置——政府与市场边界迁移的理论与经验解释  

Degree of Fiscal Decentralization and the Allocation of Control of State-Owned Enterprises:Theoretical and Empirical Explanations for the Migration of the Government-Market Boundary

作　　者：徐宝亮 李康 邓宏图 XU Baoliang;LI Kang;DENG Hongtu(School of Economics and Management,Nanchang University,Nanchang 330031,China;School of Economics,Fujian Normal University,Fuzhou 350117,China;School of Economics and Statistics,Guangzhou University,Guangzhou 510006,China)

机构地区：[1]南昌大学经济管理学院,江西南昌330031 [2]福建师范大学经济学院,福建福州350117 [3]广州大学经济与统计学院,广东广州510006

出　　处：《当代经济科学》2022年第6期84-96,共13页Modern Economic Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“全面建成小康社会背景下新型城乡关系研究”(17ZDA067);广东省社会科学规划项目“数字经济视域下广东省内需扩大的驱动机制、支撑条件与政策体系研究”(GD21YLJ01)。

摘　　要：围绕国有企业控制权的配置,构建中央政府与地方政府博弈的马尔科夫精炼均衡模型,在求解博弈均衡的基础上探究均衡迁移的内生性原因,为改革后中国财政分权度的变化与国有企业控制权的不同配置提供解释。研究发现:在改革初期,相对于市场,计划在资源配置中占绝对地位,此时为充分发挥国有企业的宏观调控职能以实现各自效用的最大化,中央政府实施财政分权,而地方政府则维持对国有企业的控制权;随着市场的发展,产品价格实现基本统一后,国有企业在产品市场上的宏观调控职能为以市场为媒介的财政政策、货币政策等所替代,此时的均衡路径为中央政府实施财政集权,而地方政府转移国有企业的控制权;亏损补贴和国民收入影响中央政府对财政分权度的选择,但推动均衡路径迁移的关键变量是市场化所决定的国家宏观调控参数。After 1978,the national financial system was reformed from a“messing together”system to a graded lump-sum system,implying a shift from fiscal centralization to fiscal decentralization.However,the graded lump-sum system did not last forever,and the introduction of the tax sharing system in 1994 again centralized most of the fiscal power to the central government.After that,the government put forward the reform idea of restructuring major enterprises and relaxing control over small ones for state-owned enterprises(SOEs)in 1995,and implemented the reform of privatization of small and medium-sized state-owned enterprises,which set off a large-scale privatization wave.Understanding the relationship between the implementation of the tax sharing system and the privatization of SOEs is necessary for the subsequent reform of SOEs,thus deserves an in-depth discussion.This paper constructs a Markov perfect equilibrium model of the game between the central government and local governments around the allocation of SOE control.On the basis of solving the game equilibrium,it explores the endogenous causes of equilibrium migration,and provides explanations for changes in the degree of fiscal decentralization and the different allocations of SOE control in post-reform China.Research results are as follows.At the early stage of reform,the planned economy occupied an absolute position in resource allocation compared with the market economy.At this time,in order to give full play to the macro-regulation function of SOEs to maximize their respective utilities,the central government implemented fiscal decentralization,while local governments maintained control over SOEs.With the development of market economy,when the product prices were basically unified,the macro-regulation function of SOEs in the product market was replaced by market-mediated fiscal and monetary policies.The equilibrium path at this point was for the central government to implement fiscal centralization,while local governments to transfer control of SOEs.Deficit

关 键 词：财政分权度 国有企业控制权 宏观调控职能 市场化水平 马尔科夫精炼均衡 

分 类 号：F812.2[经济管理—财政学] F276.1