信息传递与最优机制设计:基于安全生产责任事故的经济学分析  

Information Communication and the Optimal Mechanism Design:A Model Based on Safety Production

作　　者：张岚 许晓言 侯琨 曲玮 Zhang Lan;Xu Xiaoyan;Hou Kun;Qu Wei

机构地区：[1]北京师范大学人文和社会科学高等研究院 [2]西南财经大学经济与管理研究院 [3]河南大学经济学院

出　　处：《财经科学》2022年第10期76-90,共15页Finance & Economics

摘　　要：本文研究了安全生产责任事故中的信息传递和最优奖惩机制设计问题,通过刻画安全生产责任事故中地方官员的瞒报和虚报动机,我们发现,相对于事故预防不力的惩罚而言,对事故救助不力的惩罚能更有效地监督地方官员,从而杜绝瞒报或虚报灾情的情况。进一步研究发现,针对地方官员的不同责任与承担压力,匹配不同的管理机制可以更为有效地控制事故发生和降低对社会造成的损失。如当地方官员承担的责任重大时,上级政府可以通过给予更多正向的激励机制和加强安全生产教育来促进地方官员付出更多的努力来降低事故发生、减少给社会造成的损失;反之,当地方官员的责任较小时,上级政府则应该通过建立畅通的信息传递机制来杜绝瞒报的发生。社会福利分析还表明,加大救助不力的惩罚力度将有利于提高整体社会的福利水平。This paper studies the optimal mechanism design in safety production.We build up a dynamic model that involves the public,the lower-level government and the upper-level government.Firstly,we characterize the communication equilibria between the lower-and upper-levels of the government,and establish the conditions under which the lower level of government has incentives to over-report and under-report the true state of the accident.Also,we show that the punishment aimed to ensure salvation is more effective than the punishment aimed to reduce the accident with regard to reducing the information asymmetry between the lower-and upper levels of the administration.Moreover,we show that when the responsibility is high,the upper-level government can incentivize the effort of the lower-level officials by raising the salary.By contrast,when the responsibility is low,the upper-level government should resort to the petition channel to curb the incentive to hide from the truth by the lower-level government officials.Finally,our results highlight the role of punishment aimed to ensure salvation in enhancing the social welfare.

关 键 词：信息传递 安全生产责任事故 虚报 瞒报 奖惩机制设计 

分 类 号：F063.1[经济管理—政治经济学]