不良资产处置的理论逻辑与中国的实践创新  

The Theoretical Logic of Non-performing Assets Disposal and the Practice Innovation in China

作　　者：刘晓欣[1] 陈天鑫 Liu Xiaoxin;Chen Tianxin

机构地区：[1]南开大学经济学院,天津300071

出　　处：《社会科学战线》2022年第10期84-93,281,共11页Social Science Front

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目(20ZDA101)。

摘　　要：文章基于马克思政治经济学视角,认为不良资产处置在社会主义市场经济中具有避免金融危机、优化市场资源配置和稳定经济增长的功能。与西方金融危机期间政府的临时救助和逐利的秃鹫基金相比,中国的不良资产处置始终遵循金融服务实体经济的本质属性,秉持金融“公器”性质,以配置市场资源和防范化解金融风险为首要任务。“监管+大行”模式构成中国不良资产处置长效机制的重要内容。中国经济高增长背后的不良资产处置规律和机制具有重要的价值。This paper,based on the perspective of Marxist political economy,holds that the disposal of non-performing assets has the function of avoiding financial crisis,optimizing the allocation of market resources and stabilizing the economic growth in the socialist market economy.Compared with the western government's temporary bailouts and profit-seeking Vulture Hedge Funds during the financial crisis,the disposal of non-performing assets in China always follows the essential attribute of financial services to the real economy,adheres to the“public instrument”nature of finance,and takes the allocation of market resources and prevention and defusing financial risks as the primary task.The model of“supervision+big bank”constitutes a long-term mechanism for the disposal of non-performing assets in China.

关 键 词：不良资产处置 金融危机 实体经济 政府与市场 宏观审慎监管 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学]