政府创新补贴的战略选择与微观效应研究  

Study on the Strategic Choice and Micro Effect of Government Subsidy on Enterprises Innovation

作　　者：汪利锬 沈言言 WANG Litan;SHEN Yanyan(College of business,Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting and Finance,Shanghai,201620;School of Economics,Hefei University of Technology,Hefei,230009)

机构地区：[1]上海立信会计金融学院财税与公共管理学院 [2]合肥工业大学经济学院

出　　处：《中国经济问题》2022年第4期94-108,共15页China Economic Studies

摘　　要：为了揭示政府创新补贴企业的内在选择机制及其微观效应,文章构建了一个离散型的政府创新补贴理论模型,并利用Heckman选择模型识别和评估了2008—2020年间政府补贴上市企业的内在选择机制及其微观效应。研究发现,政府采用“纳税额、企业营业总收入和公司规模”三项“择优”指标遴选补贴对象。据此,文章提出几点完善和调整现有创新补贴政策的建议。To reveal the internal selection mechanism and the micro effect of government subsidy on enterprises innovation, this article constructs a discrete theoretical model of firms innovation granted by government, and uses Heckman selection model to identify and evaluate the internal selection mechanism of firms innovation by employing firms listed in SSE and SZE from 2008 to 2020. The article finds that governments prefer three indicators, such as tax amount, total operating income and enterprises size, to subsidize firms innovation. Accordingly, this article presents some suggestions to improve and adjust current policy on firms innovation.

关 键 词：政府创新补贴 “择优”战略 “扶贫”战略 随机过程 自有研发投入 

分 类 号：F812.45[经济管理—财政学] F273.1F832.51