反腐败、能源投资和能源效率  被引量:3

Anti-corruption,Energy Investment and Energy Efficiency

在线阅读下载全文

作  者:刘洁 郭剑鸣[1,2] 刘相锋 LIU Jie;GUO Jianming;LIU Xiangfeng(School of Public Administration,Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics,Hangzhou 310018,China;Government Regulation and Public Policy Research Institute,A New Type of Key Professional Think Tank in Zhejiang Province,Hangzhou 310018,China;China Institute of Regulation Research,Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics,Hangzhou 310018,China)

机构地区:[1]浙江财经大学公共管理学院,浙江杭州310018 [2]浙江省新型专业智库“浙江财经大学政府监管与公共政策研究院”,浙江杭州310018 [3]浙江财经大学中国政府管制研究院,浙江杭州310018

出  处:《财经论丛》2022年第12期103-112,共10页Collected Essays on Finance and Economics

基  金:国家社会科学基金重点项目(20AZZ012);国家自然科学基金项目(72003168);浙江省社会科学规划重点项目(21WZQH10Z);浙江省自然科学基金项目(LY19G030016)。

摘  要:本文采用2000—2017年30个省份的面板数据,检验腐败对能源效率的影响及其作用机制。研究结果显示,腐败扭曲能源投资并显著抑制了能源效率的提升,加大反腐败力度较好地抑制腐败对能源投资的负面影响。从反腐败的角度,为我国能源投资监管机制优化、能源效率进一步提升给予可借鉴的思路和方法。In the process of high-quality development of the energy industry, energy corruption has become an important issue. How to improve the energy efficiency through industry integrity has become the focus of the government. Based on this problem, from the perspective of the energy investment, this paper uses the panel data of 30 provinces from 2000 to 2017 to test the impact of corruption on the energy efficiency. The results of the study are as follows: 1) Corruption significantly inhibits the improvement of the energy efficiency;2) The intermediary effect of the energy investment is significant;3) Strengthening anti-corruption can better inhibit the negative impact of corruption on the energy investment. Therefore, from the perspective of anti-corruption, this paper provides references for optimizing China’s energy investment regulatory mechanisms and further improving the energy efficiency.

关 键 词:反腐败 能源投资 能源效率 能源监管 

分 类 号:F402.3[经济管理—产业经济]

 

参考文献:

正在载入数据...

 

二级参考文献:

正在载入数据...

 

耦合文献:

正在载入数据...

 

引证文献:

正在载入数据...

 

二级引证文献:

正在载入数据...

 

同被引文献:

正在载入数据...

 

相关期刊文献:

正在载入数据...

相关的主题
相关的作者对象
相关的机构对象