政府补贴机制下供应链成员社会责任捐赠决策分析  

Socially responsible donation decision analysis in a supply chain under government subsidy

作　　者：杜东旭 杨锋[1] 王漫漫 Dongxu Du;Feng Yang;Manman Wang(International Institute of Finance,School of Management,University of Science and Technology of China,Hefei 230601,China)

机构地区：[1]中国科学技术大学管理学院国际金融研究院,安徽合肥230601

出　　处：《中国科学技术大学学报》2022年第11期26-39,I0003,共15页JUSTC

基　　金：supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(71991464,71991460,71921001);the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities。

摘　　要：社会责任捐赠作为企业体现社会责任的一种重要形式,正日益普及并受到越来越多的关注。鼓励企业履行社会责任,改善社会福利,是一项重要课题。近年来,企业通过责任捐赠活动展现社会责任已成为一种流行趋势。在此背景下,本文建立了一个三阶段的Stackelberg博弈模型来探究政府补贴对零售商主导的供应链最优捐赠决策问题的影响。结果表明零售企业为了取得更好的销售业绩,往往会选择实施责任捐赠活动,但并不是责任捐赠越多,销售业绩就越好。在没有政府补贴的情况下,当供应链成员实现利润最大化时,社会福利并不是最优的,利润最大化目标下的捐赠水平总是低于社会福利最大化下的捐赠水平。为此,提出了一个最优补贴率,以消除捐赠差距,使社会福利最大化。本研究表明政府补贴可以促进供应链成员提高责任捐赠水平,同时改善供应链的绩效和社会福利。此外,还分析了成本参数和消费者企业责任偏好对均衡结果的影响。我们的研究为集中决策的企业和监管者提供了社会责任捐赠决策方面的管理见解。As an important form for firms to demonstrate social responsibility,socially responsible donation(SRD)is becoming increasingly widespread and attracting more attention.It is important to encourage firms to effectively undertake social responsibilities and improve social welfare.Recently,it has become very popular for firms to demonstrate their social responsibility through SRD campaigns.With the aim of solving the decision-making problem of a retailer-led socially responsible supply chain considering government subsidy,this study established a three-stage Stackelberg game model.By analyzing the impact of pricing and donation decisions on operations and management,either with or without government subsidy,we found that to achieve better performance,retail firms will choose to implement donation activities.However,it is not the case that the higher the donation,the better the performance.In addition,there is a gap:without government subsidy,social welfare is not optimal when members’performance in the supply chain is maximized,and more donations are needed to maximize social welfare.This study proves that government subsidy can encourage supply chain members to generate more donations,while improving the performance of the supply chain and social welfare.We propose an optimal subsidy rate to eliminate the gap and maximize social welfare.We also analyze the impact of external parameters,including the cost parameter and consumer preference level,on the equilibrium results.Finally,we extend this research to provide management insights for businesses under uncertain market sizes and centralized decision-making scenarios.

关 键 词：企业社会责任 政府补贴 社会责任捐赠 消费者偏好 

分 类 号：F252[经济管理—国民经济]