养老金奖惩机制对退休决策的影响研究——基于累积前景理论的视角  

The Influence of the Pension Reward and Punishment Mechanism on the Retirement Decision: From the Perspective of Cumulative Prospect Theory

作　　者：莫一茗 何林[1] MO Yi-ming;HE Lin

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学财政金融学院

出　　处：《保险研究》2022年第10期112-127,共16页Insurance Studies

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(21AZD028)“构建金融有效支持实体经济着力点的体制机制研究”支持。

摘　　要：随着人口老龄化问题的日益严峻,延迟退休势在必行。如何通过机制设计有效引导参保人自愿选择延迟退休是重要的研究课题。本文参考国际上弹性退休政策和养老金奖惩机制的实践经验,旨在设计一种符合我国人口变化规律和经济发展状况的养老金领取待遇奖惩机制。在此机制下,通过比较养老金财富的精算净现值作为退休决策的依据。同时,考虑到参保人的不完全理性,引入累积前景理论刻画其对领取低于缴费的厌恶,以及对早亡概率的扭曲认知。研究结果表明:即使考虑到参保人的不完全理性行为,奖惩机制依然可以有效激励参保人选择延迟退休。此外,部分奖惩参数存在门槛效应,需要谨慎设计奖惩机制的微观方案,以起到有效的激励效果。With the increasingly serious population aging problem, it is imperative to delay retirement.How to effectively lead the pension participants to voluntarily delay retirement through mechanism design is an important issue.Referring to the practical experiences of flexible retirement policies and pension reward and punishment mechanisms in the world, we aim to design a reward and punishment mechanism for pension benefits that conforms to the law of population change and economic development in China.Under this mechanism, the actuarial net present value of pension wealth is compared as the basis for retirement decision.At the same time, considering the incomplete rationality of the participants, the cumulative prospect theory is introduced to describe their aversion at the case of receiving less benefit than contributions, and their distorted concept of the probability of early death.The results show that the reward and punishment mechanism can still effectively encourage the participants to delay retirement, even considering their incomplete rationality.In addition, some reward and punishment parameters exhibit threshold effects.Thus, the pension authority should carefully design the micro scheme of the reward and punishment mechanism to achieve the incentive effect.

关 键 词：延迟退休 养老金财富 累积前景理论 奖惩机制 退休决策 

分 类 号：F840[经济管理—保险] C979[经济管理—劳动经济]