短视频平台侵权双方的动态博弈分析  

Dynamic Game Analysis of Short Video Platform Infringers and Victims

作　　者：张兵 张燕[1] ZHANG Bing;ZHANG Yan(School of Economics and Management,Communication University of China,Beijing 100024,China)

机构地区：[1]中国传媒大学经济与管理学院,北京100024

出　　处：《北京印刷学院学报》2022年第10期47-51,共5页Journal of Beijing Institute of Graphic Communication

摘　　要：短视频行业在近几年得到了爆发式的发展,在野蛮生长过后,侵权问题日渐凸显并且日益严重,损害了创作方的利益。本文通过对短视频行业侵权方和创作方之间的微观经济学分析,同时建立二阶段动态博弈模型,探究影响版权保护的因素,发现:短视频侵权的概率与长视频的维权成本成正比,与长视频维权而导致的短视频受到的损失以及给予长视频的补偿成反比;长视频选择维权的概率与短视频侵权的利润成正比,与短视频侵权的成本成反比,与短视频在长视频维权后受到的损失成反比。本文认为,促进网络版权的保护,需要公众、平台和政府共同做出努力,从而实现短视频和长视频的双赢。In the context of the explosive development of the short video industry in recent years, the infringement problem becomes increasingly prominent and serious. In order to explore the influencing factors of copyright protection, we adopt the theoretical analysis method of microeconomics and built a two-stage dynamic game model. There reaches the following conclusion: the probability of short video infringement is proportional to the cost of long video rights protection. It is inversely proportional to the loss of short videos caused by long video rights protection and the compensation given to long videos. The probability of choosing to protect the rights of long videos is proportional to the profits of short video infringement, and inversely proportional to the cost of short video infringement and the loss of short videos after long video rights protection. To promote the protection of network copyright, the public, platform and government should make joint efforts to achieve a win-win situation for short video and long video.

关 键 词：短视频 版权保护 动态博弈模型 

分 类 号：D913[政治法律—民商法学]