高质量审计师与家族企业债券信用利差  

High-quality Auditors and Credit Spreads of Family Firm Bonds

作　　者：余玉苗[1] 王植 YU Yumiao;WANG Zhi(School of Economics and Management,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《南京审计大学学报》2022年第6期1-10,共10页Journal of Nanjing Audit University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(72072133)。

摘　　要：利用2008—2020年A股上市家族企业发行的公司债券数据,从审计治理效应的角度研究在债券存续期内高质量审计师对家族企业债券信用利差的影响。研究发现:在家族企业中,来自“十大”会计师事务所的审计师和具有行业专长的审计师能降低债券信用利差,这种降低作用是通过降低企业信息风险、抑制控股家族侵占行为实现的。异质性分析结果表明,在控制权和现金流权分离程度高、机构投资者参与治理程度低的家族企业中,高质量审计师与债券信用利差之间的负向关系更为显著。结论从审计治理效应的角度丰富了有关家族企业公司治理的理论研究。Using the data of corporate bonds issued by listed family firms in 2008—2020,this paper examines the impact of high-quality auditors on the credit spreads from the perspective of audit governance.This paper finds that high-quality auditors from top 10 accounting firms can reduce credit spreads of corporate bonds issued by family firms,which is realized by reducing the enterprise information risk and restraining the entrenchment of the controlling families.Furthermore,the heterogeneity analysis finds that the negative relation between high-quality auditors and credit spreads is more significant in family firms where the high degree of separation between control rights and cashflow rights is larger and with less participation of institutional investors.The conclusion enriches the literature on corporate governance in family firms from the perspective of audit governance.

关 键 词：高质量审计师 审计治理 信用利差 公司债券 家族企业 债券违约 公司治理 金融风险 

分 类 号：F239[经济管理—会计学]