BOT+EPC项目参与主体行为分析  

Analysis of the Behavior of Participating Parties in BOT+EPC Projects

作　　者：张涛 ZHANG Tao(Qingdao Municipal Engineering Design&Research Institute Co.,Ltd,Qingdao 266000,China)

机构地区：[1]青岛市市政工程设计研究院有限责任公司,山东青岛266000

出　　处：《建筑经济》2022年第12期43-47,共5页Construction Economy

摘　　要：高速公路作为我国陆运交通网的重要组成部分,对我国经济发展具有重要的促进作用。在高速公路建设领域,政府进行了BOT+EPC模式高速公路项目试点建设,取得了丰富的成果,但项目建设过程中总承包商扩大项目设计施工收益的问题较为突出。故本文运用博弈论,对BOT+EPC高速公路项目建设过程中政府、项目公司和总承包商的利益关系和策略选择进行分析,并基于分析结果给出了一定的政策建议,为政府制定相关措施促进BOT+EPC模式发展提供参考。As an important part of China’s land transportation network,expressways play an important role in promoting China’s economic development.In the field of expressway construction,the government has carried out the pilot construction of BOT+EPC model expressway projects and achieved rich results,but the problem of general contractor expanding the project design and construction revenue during the project construction is more prominent.Therefore,this paper uses game theory to analyze the interests and strategic choices of the government,project companies and general contractors in the process of BOT+EPC expressway project construction,and gives policy suggestions based on the analysis results,which provides a reference for the government to formulate relevant measures to promote the development of BOT+EPC model.

关 键 词：BOT+EPC模式 高速公路项目 博弈论 

分 类 号：F284[经济管理—国民经济] F224.32