撤县设市、行政扩权与工业用地价格  

County-to-city Upgrading,Empowerment and Industrial Land Prices

作　　者：刘文华[1] 谢婷 肖伟 Liu Wenhua;Xie Ting;Xiao Wei(Institute of Western China Economic Research,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics;Research Institute of Economics and Management,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics)

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学中国西部经济研究院,四川成都611130 [2]西南财经大学经济与管理研究院,四川成都611130

出　　处：《经济科学》2022年第6期39-55,共17页Economic Science

基　　金：教育部高等学校学科创新引智计划(项目编号:B16040);中央高校基本科研业务费项目“新型城镇化与可持续发展研究基地”(项目编号:JBK1960601);“何为而治——中国当代社会治理研究”第三期资助项目的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：本文使用2013—2019年中国土地网的交易数据,以撤县设市为外生冲击,分析了行政扩权对工业用地使用的影响。研究发现,撤县设市提升了以低于国家规定最低标准价格出让的工业用地的比重,并且导致工业用地价格降低了约9.60%。实证结果不支持土地供应增加导致地价下降的假说。进一步分析发现,撤县设市增加了以非“招拍挂”方式出让的工业用地比重,削弱了市场配置土地资源的能力。本文分析表明,新型城镇化背景下,县级政府在撤县设市后获得了更大的自主权,通过干预工业土地转让降低了工业用地价格。Using transaction data on chinalands􀆰com from 2013 to 2019,this paper analyzes the impact of administrative empowerment on industrial land prices by taking county-to-city upgrading(che xian she shi)as exogenous shocks.We found that the county-to-city upgrading leads to an increase in the proportion of industrial land transferred to enterprises at a price lower than the minimum standard stipulated by the state.The empirical results showed that the industrial land prices decreased by about 9􀆰60%.The results do not support the hypothesis that increases in land supply lead to decreases in land prices.Further analysis showed that after county-to-city upgrading,a larger proportion of industrial land was transacted in a nonmarket way,which weakened the capability of market allocation of land resources.This paper shows that under the context of new urbanization,countylevel governments obtained more power through county-to-city upgrading and had stronger motivation to intervene industrial land markets,resulting in decreases in industrial land prices.

关 键 词：撤县设市 行政扩权 工业用地 土地出让方式 新型城镇化 

分 类 号：F293.2[经济管理—国民经济]