政府R&D补贴分配策略探讨:创新“主力军”与“国家队”之争  

Discussion on the Allocation Strategy of Government R&D Subsidy:The Competition Between "Main Force" and "National Team" of Innovation

作　　者：赵凯[1] 郝一冰 王健[1] Zhao Kai;Hao Yibing;Wang Jian(Institute of Quantitative Economics,Huaqiao University,Xiamen 361021,China)

机构地区：[1]华侨大学数量经济研究院,福建厦门361021

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2022年第19期45-51,共7页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金后期资助项目“政府补贴策略与企业创新行为研究”(20FJYB017)。

摘　　要：针对如何将政府有限的R&D补贴资金在创新“主力军”(企业)与创新“国家队”(科研机构)之间进行“最优”分配这一重要问题进行解答。通过构建涉及政府、企业和科研机构三部门的三阶段动态博弈模型,理论探寻政府补贴最优分配策略,探究行业规模、产研合作、技术溢出等一系列因素对政府R&D补贴制定和实施的影响。研究证实,只有当溢出效应达到或超过一定水平时,政府才会对企业实施R&D补贴,并且伴随溢出效应的增大,政府会提升补贴预算资金中向企业投放的比例;产研合作不仅有利于强化企业与科研机构的研发投入意愿,还有益于企业利润、消费者福利以及社会福利水平的提升;较高程度的产研合作会增强政府向科研机构实施R&D补贴的意愿而降低政府对企业研发的支持力度。This paper is aimed at the optimal allocation strategy between the enterprises and the scientific institutions when the government R&D subsidy funds are limited. The optimal allocation strategy of government R&D subsidy is theoretically discussed by a three-stage dynamic game model involving the government, enterprises and scientific research institutions. And the factors such as industry scale, industry-research cooperation, and technology spillover are studied, which affect the formulation and implementation of government R&D subsidy. The research confirms that: Only if the technology spillover exceeds a certain level, will the government implement R&D subsidy to enterprises. And the government will increase the proportion of the R&D subsidy to enterprises with the increase of the technology spillover. Industry-research cooperation can not only increase the R&D investment of enterprises and scientific institutions, but also improve the enterprise profits, consumer welfare and social welfare. A higher degree of industry-research cooperation will increase the government R&D subsidies to scientific institutions and reduce the government R&D support subsidies to enterprise.

关 键 词：补贴分配策略 产研合作 技术溢出 企业创新 

分 类 号：F124.3[经济管理—世界经济] F204[文化科学] G301