产出不确定下订单农业供应链中的违约风险研究  

Research on Default Risk in Contract-farming Supply Chain with Uncertain Output

作　　者：苏晓芳 王文利[1] 张睿贞 SU Xiaofang;WANG Wenli;ZHANG Ruizhen(School of Economics and Management,Taiyuan University of Science and Technology,Taiyuan 030024,China)

机构地区：[1]太原科技大学经济与管理学院,山西太原030024

出　　处：《物流科技》2022年第19期140-144,149,共6页Logistics Sci-Tech

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(72171162);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(20YJC630148);山西省留学人员科技活动项目(2019047)。

摘　　要：由于农户产出不确定,订单农业中声誉差的公司可能会因为供需不匹配而做出违约的决定。文章构建农户和公司之间的Stackelberg博弈模型,分别研究在集中决策、分散决策下公司违约以及不违约的情况,探讨供应链各方决策及期望利润的变化。研究表明,声誉差的公司在违约情况下能获得较高利润,但此时将库存风险转移给农户使得农户利润急剧下降,进而使得整个供应链利润下降;而声誉好的公司不会违约,虽然公司利润不会很高,但整个供应链利润优于违约情况下利润。管理启示是,公司不应该只考虑眼前利益而使得整个供应链利润下降,或者由于违约而失去合作伙伴,因此供应链中各方应该遵守合约,实现互利共赢的局面。最后提出相关建议以促进乡村农业的发展。Due to the uncertain output of farmers,companies with poor reputation in contract-farming may make default decisions because of the mismatch between supply and demand.Construct a Stackelberg game model between farmers and companies,study the default and non default of companies under centralized and decentralized decisions,and discuss the changes of decisions and expected profits of all parties in the supply chain.The research shows that companies with poor reputation can obtain higher profits in case of default,but transferring inventory risk to farmers makes farmers'profits decline sharply,and then the profits of the whole supply chain decline.Companies with good reputation will not default.Although the company's profit will not be very high,the profit of the whole supply chain is better than that in case of default.The management enlightenment is that the company should not consider the immediate interests and reduce the profits of the whole supply chain,or lose partners due to breach of contract.Therefore,all parties in the supply chain should abide by the contract to achieve a win-win situation.Finally,relevant suggestions are put forward to promote the development of rural agriculture.

关 键 词：产出不确定 订单农业 供需不匹配 违约风险 

分 类 号：F252.8[经济管理—国民经济]