风险规避、交易成本与租佃合约的选择——基于“满铁”调查的分析  

Risk Sharing,Transaction Cost and Agrarian Contract Choice:Based on the SMR Survey

作　　者：林展[1,2] 彭凯翔 Lin Zhan;Peng Kaixiang

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学清史研究所,北京100872 [2]中国人民大学数字人文研究中心,北京100872 [3]武汉大学经济与管理学院,武汉430072

出　　处：《中国经济史研究》2022年第6期54-66,共13页Researches in Chinese Economic History

基　　金：中国人民大学科学研究基金(中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助)项目(批准号:22XNQT24)(林展)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：利用民国时期“满铁”调查资料中54个村庄的数据,本文分析了佃农的风险规避倾向和交易成本对农业租佃合约类型的影响。研究发现:佃农的土地财产越少,越可能与地主订立分成租约,这支持了风险分担的假说;地主住在村外(或城市)、或住在村内但出租的土地位于村外,越倾向于签订定额租约,这支持了交易成本中的监督成本假说;在地主提供大牲畜的情况下,更可能与佃农签订分成租约,这符合交易成本中的多项任务假说。本研究有助于更好地理解影响租佃合约类型的因素以及不同租佃合约的功能,也有助于理解近代农业生产中不同生产要素的组合过程。Using household survey conducted by the South Manchuria Railways Company(SMR)in the 1930 s,this paper tests how risk sharing and transaction costs influence the types of agricultural contract choices.The empirical studies find that the less land property tenants have,which means the more risk averse tenants are,the more likely share tenancy will be chosen;that if the landlords live outside the village(or in the city),or live in the village but the leased land located outside the village,which means the landlords have higher costs of monitoring and fixed-rent contracts will be adopted,this supports the supervision cost hypothesis;that when landlord provides large livestock,it is more likely the share tenancy be signed,which is consistent with multiple tasks hypothesis.This study shed new lights on the understand the influencing factors of different tenancy contracts,and on the production factors allocation in Modern rural China.

关 键 词：风险规避 交易成本 租佃合约 “满铁”调查 

分 类 号：F323[经济管理—产业经济]