信息不对称下考虑行为偏好的绿色供应链激励契约设计  

Incentive Contract Design of Green Supply Chain Considering Behavior Preference under Information Asymmetry

作　　者：王琳斐 WANG Lin-fei(Qingdao University of Science and Technology,Qingdao 266061,China)

机构地区：[1]青岛科技大学,山东青岛266061

出　　处：《物流工程与管理》2022年第11期41-44,共4页Logistics Engineering and Management

摘　　要：文中以一个具有风险厌恶和过度自信的制造商和一个完全理性零售商组成的二级供应链为研究对象。在产品绿色度信息不对称下,利用委托代理模型研究了制造商行为偏好对产品绿色度及激励契约设计的影响。研究表明:最优绿色度和转移价格的设定与制造商的两种行为偏好均相关;制造商的风险厌恶和过度自信对绿色信息共享价值分别存在正向和负向影响;零售商更愿意与风险厌恶程度较低、过度自信水平较高的制造商合作。This paper takes a secondary supply chain composed of a manufacturer with risk aversion and overconfidence and a fully rational retailer as the research object.Based on the assumption of information asymmetric of product greenness degree,the influence of manufacturer s behavior preference on product greenness degree and incentive contract design is studied by building principal-agent model.The research shows that the optimal greenness degree and transfer price are both related to the two behavior preferences of manufacturers,manufacturer s risk aversion has a positive impact on the value of green information sharing while overconfidence has a negative impact on it,and retailer prefers to cooperate with manufacturer with low risk aversion and high level of overconfidence.

关 键 词：绿色度 信息不对称 行为偏好 委托代理模型 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]