考虑设备回收的服务型制造供应链契约选择与设计优化  

Supply chain contract selection and design optimization with equipment recycling under service-oriented manufacturing

作　　者：何娜 蒋忠中[1,2] 王健[1,2] 崔帅[1] HE Na;JIANG Zhongzhong;WANG Jian;CUI Shuai(School of Business Administration,Northeastern University,Shenyang 110167,China;Institute of Behavioral and Service Operations Management,Northeastern University,Shenyang 110167,China)

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,沈阳110167 [2]东北大学行为与服务运作管理研究所,沈阳110167

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2022年第11期2927-2940,共14页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71971052);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金(22YJC630031);中央高校基本科研业务费(N2006006);111项目(B16009)。

摘　　要：设备回收作为实现节能环保的有效途径,近年来正逐步成为服务型制造供应链创新发展的重要环节,如何在设备回收情形下进行供应链契约选择与设计优化,进而提升服务型制造设备运营效率是亟待解决的重要问题.为此,本文针对服务型制造供应链中考虑设备回收的供应链契约选择与设计问题,首先分别在收益共享契约和成本分担契约情形下构建由服务型制造商和运营商组成的博弈模型.其次,通过分析服务型制造供应链中服务型制造商和运营商的利润,给出供应链契约的最优选择与设计.结果表明最优供应链契约选择主要由运营商成本率和设备初始变动价值决定,二者在不同区间时应选择不同的供应链契约.最后,将模型扩展到具有政府奖惩机制的情形,即政府根据设备回收残值对服务型制造商进行奖励或惩罚,结果发现政府奖惩机制在收益共享和成本分担契约下均对服务型制造商有激励作用,而仅在收益共享契约下对运营商有激励作用.研究结论可为服务制造下考虑设备回收的供应链契约选择与设计优化提供有益的管理启示.Equipment recycling is an effective way to achieve energy conservation and environmental protection.In recent years,it has gradually become the key to the development of service-oriented manufacturing supply chain.How to optimize supply chain contract and improve the operation efficiency of equipment with the equipment recycling is a critical issue to be solved urgently.This paper investigates the supply chain contract selection and design problem with equipment recycling under the service-oriented manufacturing.This paper first constructs a game model composed of a service-oriented manufacturer and an operator under the revenue sharing contract and the cost sharing contract,respectively.Second,this paper analyzes profits of the service-oriented manufacturer and the operator,and the optimal supply chain contract is given.The results show that the optimal supply chain contract selection is mainly determined by the cost rate of the operator and the initial variable value of equipment.Finally,the model is extended to the case of government reward and penalty mechanism.If the residual value of the equipment is greater than the standard residual value,the service-oriented manufacturer will be rewarded,and otherwise it will be punished.The results show the reward and punishment mechanism have an incentive effect on the service-oriented manufacturer under the revenue sharing contract and the cost sharing contract.However,the reward and punishment mechanism only have an incentive effect on operators under the revenue sharing contract.The research results can provide useful management implications for supply chain contract selection and design optimization considering equipment recovery in service-oriented manufacturing supply chain.

关 键 词：服务型制造 设备回收 收益共享 成本分担 奖惩机制 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学]