国家审计治理地方政府专项债券问题的博弈分析——现象、机理、路径  

Game Analysis of State Audit in the Governance of Local Government Special Bond Issues——Phenomena,Mechanisms,Paths

作　　者：韩文琰 Han Wen-yan

机构地区：[1]中国劳动关系学院,北京100048

出　　处：《青海民族大学学报（社会科学版）》2022年第3期94-100,共7页Journal of Qinghai Minzu University：Social Sciences

基　　金：北京市社会科学基金项目“北京财政风险的估量及内控制度的设计”(项目编号:15JGB111);北京青年政治学院博士基金项目“北京地方政府隐性债务风险的防范研究”(项目编号:BS202002)的阶段性研究成果。

摘　　要：国家审计是治理地方政府专项债券问题的一种重要手段。从审计结果来看,地方政府专项债券既存在闲置不用、挪作他用、无效使用等违规现象,也存在停发不用的不作为现象,并且横向上有“同群效应”,纵向上有“屡审屡犯”“边改边犯”偏好。通过对地方政府、地方审计机关与国家审计机关三方的博弈分析,发现在地方政府专项债券问题出现初期,国家审计的奖励机制比较有效;当专项债券问题较多时,惩罚机制更有效。为实现长期动态博弈精炼纳什均衡,建议改变审计策略,加大国家审计的力度与广度,建立专项债券内部控制审计制度与绩效审计制度。State audits are an important tool to address the issue of special bonds for local governments.From the audit results,it can be seen that there are irregularities in the use of local government special bonds,such as idle use,misappropriation and ineofective use,as well as the inaction of stopping the issuance of bonds,Besides a "herd effect" horizontally,Phere is also a preference for "repeated trial and repeated violation" and "making corrections while committing" vertically.Through the game analysis of the local governments,the local audit authorities and the national audit authorities,it is found that the incentive mechanism of the national audit is more effective in the early stage of the local government special bond probleu,but the penalty mechanism is more effective when there are more problems with special bonds.In order to achieve a long-term dvnamic game refining Nash equilibrium,it is recommended to change the audit strategy,increase the strength and breadth of state audit,and establish an internal control audit system and performance audit system for special bonds.

关 键 词：地方政府 专项债券 博弈机理 政府审计 

分 类 号：F812[经济管理—财政学]