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作 者:刘青青 陈宋生[2] 李文颖 Qingqing Liu;Songsheng Chen;Wenying Li(Business School,Beijing Technology and Business University,Beijing 100048,China;School of Management and Economics,Beijing Institute of Technology,Beijing 100081,China;School of Accounting,Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting and Finance,Shanghai 201620,China)
机构地区:[1]北京工商大学商学院,北京100048 [2]北京理工大学管理与经济学院,北京100081 [3]上海立信会计金融学院会计学院,上海201620
出 处:《会计与经济研究》2022年第6期3-19,共17页Accounting and Economics Research
基 金:国家自然科学基金项目(72002005,71972011,71672009,72102146);国家社会科学基金项目(21AZD089)。
摘 要:文章基于制度经济学引入关系性契约理论,构建成本-收益模型,阐释分析师与所调研上市公司互动行为中的底层逻辑,探究成本因素对分析师契约行为的影响,并借助社会网络分析方法,以分析师在调研网络中的位置衡量分析师为构建及维系关系所投入的专用性资产(成本)。研究发现:分析师的成本投入会使其产生自我履约行为(乐观性倾向),声誉因素和企业违约风险对分析师自我履约行为具有削弱作用。研究结论有助于进一步理清分析师隐性成本投入的影响机理,为监管层规范分析师行为提供依据。Based on institutional economics, this paper introduces relational contract theory to construct a cost-benefit model to explain the underlying logic of the interaction between analysts and the visited firms and explores the impact of cost factors on analysts’ contract behaviors. Using the method of social network analysis, we measure the specific assets(cost) invested by analysts to build and maintain the relationship based on their position in the site visiting network. The empirical results show that analysts’ cost input promotes their self-performance behavior(optimistic tendency), and that reputation factor and firm default risk have a weakening effect on analysts’ self-performance. The findings are helpful to further clarify the influence mechanism of analysts’ implicit cost input and provide evidence for regulators to regulate analysts’ behaviors.
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