他心的认识论问题  

The Epistemological Problem of Other Minds

作　　者：蒉益民[1,2] Kui Yimin

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院大学哲学院,北京102488 [2]中国社会科学院哲学研究所,北京100732

出　　处：《复印报刊资料（外国哲学）》2022年第11期80-88,共9页FOREIGN PHILOSOPHY

摘　　要：关于他心,我们几乎每个人都有着根深蒂固的信念,即在现实世界中每个人都有他私密的意识感受,并且在相同条件下他人的意识感受与我们自己相应的意识感受是一样的。但是如何为这个我们与生俱来就认为是理所当然的信念提供在认知上好的理由和依据呢?这就是关于他心的认识论问题或者说挑战。在本文中,我们首先检验对这个问题的五个主要的解决方案;我们争辩说只有其中的两个方案是真正在试图回应关于他心的认识论层面的怀疑论挑战。接下来我们改进了这两个方案,即所谓的归纳类比论证与最佳解释论证。最后我们将这两个改进后的论证结合起来为他心的认识论问题提供了一种新的解答。Concerning other minds,nearly everyone of us has this entrenched belief that in the real world,every person has private conscious experiences and moreover,under the same circumstances,they will have the same con-scious experiences as ours.But how to provide epistemically good reasons and grounds for this belief that we are born to take it for granted?This is the epistemological problem/challenge of other minds.In this paper,we have first exam-ined five major solutions to this problem and argued that only two of them are genuine attempts to meet the epistemic skeptical challenge about other minds.After that we have improved these two solutions,namely,the inductive analogy argument and the inference to the best explanation.Finally we have combined the two revised arguments and offered a new solution to the epistemological problem of other minds.

关 键 词：他心 怀疑主义 唯我论 归纳论证 最佳解释论证 

分 类 号：B017[哲学宗教—哲学理论]