考虑内生网络外部性的软件产品推荐奖励策略  

Referral Reward Strategy of Software Product Considering Endogenous Network Externality

作　　者：唐诗 窦一凡[1] TANG Shi;DOU Yifan(Fudan University,Shanghai,China)

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院

出　　处：《管理学报》2022年第12期1828-1836,1846,共10页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71832002,71672042);上海市教育委员会、上海市教育发展基金会“曙光计划”资助项目。

摘　　要：基于博弈论模型,以利润最大化为目标,同时优化软件产品价格、产品网络外部性强度和推荐奖励额度,研究企业应如何设计产品端的“病毒化设计”策略和市场端的推荐奖励策略,并探究这两种策略之间的关系。研究表明,上述两种策略之间存在复杂的联系:市场端最优的奖励分配由产品和市场两端的特性共同决定,既可能是奖励推荐人,也有可能是奖励被推荐人;在奖励推荐人且奖金额度不为零时,“病毒化设计”策略和推荐奖励策略相对独立;而当奖励被推荐人时,二者存在替代关系。In order to explore how firms can devise the referral reward program and the “viral product design” strategy and the relationship between these two strategies, this study jointly optimizes the price of the software product, network externality and the referral reward for profit maximization based on a game-theoretical model. The results show that there is a complex relationship between the two strategies. The optimal reward allocation on the market side is determined by the characteristics of both the product and the market. Either the recommender or the potential user should be rewarded under the optimal reward design;when the recommender is rewarded and the reward is nonzero, the “viral design” strategy and the recommendation reward strategy are independent from each other. In contrast, when the recommender is rewarded, two strategies are substitutable.

关 键 词：推荐策略 软件产品 网络外部性 信息产品定价 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]