重回Ellsberg双色球实验:暧昧厌恶与信息学习  

Ellsberg Revisited:Learning under Ambiguity

作　　者：刘舟 张顺明[1] LIU Zhou;ZHANG Shunming(School of Finance,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China)

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学财政金融学院,北京100872

出　　处：《计量经济学报》2022年第4期760-772,共13页China Journal of Econometrics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(72173125,72233003)。

摘　　要：本文将Ellsberg双色球实验进行了两阶段扩展,以检验决策者的静态暧昧厌恶程度与动态信息学习之间的联系.第一阶段为Ellsberg双色球实验的静态拓展,旨在测试决策者的暧昧厌恶程度,并将决策者按照暧昧厌恶程度从低到高分为四组.第二阶段为动态实验,允许决策者以试抽球的方式获取有关罐子中球的构成的信息,随后再次回答Ellsberg双色球问题,以反映信息学习对于决策的改变.我们发现,在面对有利于暧昧前景的信息时,暧昧厌恶程度较高的决策者更有可能对信号反应不足,表现出对信息的低信心.We conduct a two-stage extension of Ellsberg’s two-urn experiment and find that ambiguity aversion and attitudes toward new information when learning under ambiguity are tightly associated.The first stage is a static extension of the Ellsberg’s two-urn experiment,which is designed to test the degree of ambiguity aversion of decision makers.Instead of simply dividing subjects into ambiguity averse and ambiguity seeking,the sample is decomposed into four groups according to the first-stage experiment results.The second stage is a dynamic experiment,which allows the decision maker to obtain information by drawing the balls.And there is a trend in the second-stage experiment—subjects with a lower degree of ambiguity aversion are more likely to change their initial(ambiguity-averse) choices when faced with favorable information for the ambiguous prospect.When faced with information favorable to ambiguous prospects,decision makers with higher ambiguity aversion are more likely to underreact to the signal and show low confidence in the information.

关 键 词：Ellsberg双色球实验 暧昧性 暧昧厌恶 信息学习 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]