省以下财政分权对地方政府规模的影响研究——基于2005-2016的市级证据  

Research on the Influence of Fiscal Decentrali-zation on the Government Scale below the Provincial Level——Based on Municipal Evidence from 2005-2016

作　　者：谭新华 Xinhua Tan(School of Public Administration,Guizhou University,Guiyang,Guizhou,550025,China)

机构地区：[1]贵州大学公共管理学院,贵州贵阳550025

出　　处：《管理科学与研究（中英文版）》2022年第12期223-229,共7页Management Science and Research

摘　　要：在中国式财政分权体制下,探讨了省以下财政分权与地方政府规模之间的关系。基于我国2005-2016年地级市面板数据,运用计量模型方法对省以下财政分权与地方政府规模进行实证分析。研究发现:省以下财政分权刺激了地方政府规模扩张,“利维坦假说”在中国不成立。因为在控制了区位、经济水平、民族等因素后,发现无论是对地方政府规模扩张的直接效应,还是通过控制地区转移支付对政府规模的间接效应,作为参照“中央—省”的制度安排自行调整的省以下财政分权制度,整体上都显著的扩大了地方政府规模。作为大国分权治理的重要制度,需要创新省以下财政分权体制机制,以有效遏制地方政府规模扩张。Under the Chinese fiscal decentralization system,this paper discusses the relationship between the fiscal decentralization below the provincial level and the scale of local government.Based on the panel data of prefecture-level cities from 2005 to 2016,the econometric model is used to make an empirical analysis of fiscal decentralization and local government scale below the provincial level.It is found that the fiscal decentralization below the provincial level stimulates the expansion of local government scale,and the Leviathan hypothesis is not valid in China.After controlling factors such as location,economic level and ethnic group,it is found that both the direct effect on the expansion of the scale of local government and the indirect effect on the scale of government by controlling regional transfer payment,the sub-provincial fiscal decentralization system adjusted by itself with reference to the institutional arrangement of"central-provincial"has significantly expanded the scale of local government on the whole.As an important system of decentralized governance of major powers,it is necessary to innovate the fiscal decentralization system and mechanism below the provincial level to effectively curb the expansion of local government scale.

关 键 词：财政分权 政府规模 地级市 

分 类 号：F81[经济管理—财政学]