竞争市场下新进入企业产品质量信息披露与定价策略研究  

Quality information disclosure and pricing strategy of the entrant firmunder competitive market

作　　者：李嫣然 李波[1] 彭树霞 LI Yanran;LI Bo;PENG Shuxia(College of Management and Economics,Tianjin University,Tianjin 300072,China)

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2023年第1期125-135,共11页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目(18ZDA060)。

摘　　要：本文对双寡头竞争市场中企业的产品定价与质量信息披露问题进行了研究,分析了当新进入企业与在位企业之间、新进入企业与消费者之间分别存在产品质量信息不对称情况时,在位企业与新进入企业的产品定价决策。在此基础上,本文分析了企业间信息共享与否、在位企业定价和竞争产品质量差异对新进入企业信息披露决策的影响。本文主要结论有:企业间的信息不对称可能削弱在位企业的先动优势。即使新进入企业拥有信息不对称优势,也并不一定能制定比信息对称时更高的价格。在位企业默许低质量的新进入企业伪装成高质量企业时,可能获得更高收益。新进入企业向在位企业共享产品质量信息时,可能获得更高收益。当消费者能够通过企业间是否共享信息来判断产品质量时,可能导致新进入企业改变信息披露的决策,出现不利于消费者对产品真实质量判断的情况。When a new firm enters the market, its product quality is usually unknown to the related competing firms and consumers. Thus, the information asymmetry of product quality may significantly impact on the decision-making and revenues of the firms and consumers. On the one hand, in a competitive market, the incumbent firm can use its first-mover position to gain a competitive advantage compared with a new entrant. However, when the entrant firm has its private product quality information, it may use the advantages of information asymmetry to counter the incumbent′s first-mover advantage. Or it may choose to share information so that the two firms can achieve a win-win situation. On the other, when consumers do not know product quality information from the new entrant, product prices will affect their perception of product quality and willingness to buy. Some firms in practice that produce low-quality products use product quality information asymmetry to mislead consumers by setting higher prices. Therefore, in a competitive market, information asymmetry of product quality makes the new entrant need to weigh the pros and cons between information disclosure and pricing when facing the competitive incumbent firm and consumers with uncertain willingness to buy. When product quality information asymmetry exists between the competitive firms and between the new entrant and consumers, the disclosure strategy of product quality information will be affected by multiple factors. Whether to share private information with its competitors is a firm′s strategic decision, which may impact the pricing strategy of itself and its competitors and influence the firm′s decision to disclose quality information with consumers. Based on the above problem background, this paper studies the issue of quality information disclosure and product pricing decisions in the above-mentioned competitive market, mainly involving two aspects of information asymmetry among competing companies and product quality information disclosure.The first sec

关 键 词：双寡头市场 定价 产品质量 信息不对称 信号博弈 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]