经济增加值考核对自由现金流与过度投资关系的调节效应——基于央企控股上市公司的动态面板数据模型  

Research on the Governance Effect of Economic Value Added on the Cash Flow and Over-investment of Listed Companies Controlled by Central Enterprises

作　　者：赵世君 王妍妍 ZHAO Shi-jun;WANG Yan-yan(School of Accounting,Shanghai University of International Business and Economics,Shanghai 201620,China;Business School,Shanghai Jian Qiao University,Shanghai 202306,China)

机构地区：[1]上海对外经贸大学会计学院,上海201620 [2]上海建桥学院商学院,上海210306

出　　处：《上海对外经贸大学学报》2023年第1期94-108,共15页Journal of Shanghai University of International Business and Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金“我国零售业对接‘一带一路’市场的‘全球本土化’战略研究”(项目编号:17YJA790007)资助。

摘　　要：本文从委托代理的视角分析企业业绩评价及薪酬激励机制对企业经营者行为及后果所产生的影响。在此基础上,分析央企引入经济增加值(EVA)考核后,对抑制公司经营者持有过多货币资金及因此诱发低效率投资行为所产生的影响。为了检验EVA考核对央企控股上市公司经营者经营行为的实际影响,本文以央企控股上市公司开始实施EVA考核前后6年的财务数据实证检验国务院国资委基于EVA经营业绩考核办法的实施效果。本文研究表明,EVA考核能够有效抑制企业过度投资,并且EVA考核指标占经营业绩考核的权重越高,企业持有的自由现金流水平越高,其调节作用也越明显。本文研究结果对研究国资委历次修订《中央企业负责人经营业绩考核办法》的实施效果具有借鉴意义,也为企业制定经营者业绩评价及薪酬激励机制提供理论依据。From the perspective of principal-agent theory,this paper analyzes the impact of enterprise performance evaluation and compensation incentive mechanism on the behavior of enterprise managers and its consequences.On this basis,this paper analyzes the favorable impact of the introduction of EVA assessment by central government owned enterprises on restraining the managers from keeping too much monetary funds and thus inducing low-effi ciency investment behavior.In order to know the actual impact of EVA assessment on the business behavior of state-controlled listed companies,this paper uses the fi nancial data of 6 years before and after the implementation of EVA assessment by such companies to empirically test the implementation effect of the SASAC’s EVA business performance assessment method.Research shows that EVA performance assessment can effectively restrain enterprises from over-investing,and the higher the weight of EVA assessment indicators in business performance assessment,the higher the level of free cash fl ow retained by the enterprise,and the more obvious its regulating effect is.This paper has practical reference signifi cance for studying the implementation effect of the“Measures for Business Performance Evaluation”revised by the SASAC.

关 键 词：代理理论 EVA考核 自由现金流 过度投资 调节效应 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]