资金约束下订单农业供应链的政府补贴方式选择  

Government Subsidy Mode Selection in Contract-farming Supply Chain Under Capital Constraint

作　　者：刘丹 赵彤[2] 李太平[2] 李季鹏[3] Liu Dan;Zhao Tong;Li Taiping;Li Jipeng(School of Business Administration,Anhui University of Finance and Economics,Bengbu Anhui 233030,China;College of Economics and Management,Nanjing Agricultural University,Nanjing 210000,China;School of Business Administration,Xinjiang University of Finance and Economics,Urumqi 830012,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽财经大学工商管理学院,安徽蚌埠233030 [2]南京农业大学经济管理学院,南京210000 [3]新疆财经大学工商管理学院,乌鲁木齐830012

出　　处：《统计与决策》2022年第24期159-163,共5页Statistics & Decision

基　　金：国家自然科学基金地区科学基金项目(71662031);国家自然科学基金面上项目(71973066);国家社会科学基金资助项目(17XMZ093)。

摘　　要：研究由面临产出不确定的多个资金约束的农户与单个资金充裕的公司组成的订单农业供应链时,公司不但按订单收购农户的农产品,还向其提供生产所需资金,同时政府向农户提供补贴资金。文章通过建立Stackelberg博弈模型,求解动态补贴以及固定补贴两种机制下农户的最优生产投入量与公司的最优借款利率。结果显示,政府补贴不仅能促进农户的生产积极性,还能降低农户的融资成本。若以促进农户的生产投入量为目标,政府应在补贴率较低的情况下使用固定补贴机制,而在补贴率较高的情况下使用动态补贴机制。When we study the contract-farming supply chain composed of farmers with multiple financial constraints and a single company with sufficient funds,the company not only buys the farmers’agricultural products according to the order,but also provides the necessary funds for production,and the government provides subsidies to the farmers.This paper establishes the Stackelberg game model to solve the optimal production input of farmers and the optimal borrowing rate of firms under the dynamic subsidy and fixed subsidy mechanisms.The results are shown as follows:Government subsidies can not only promote farmers’production enthusiasm,but also reduce farmers’financing costs.If the goal is to promote the production input of farmers,the fixed subsidy is better than the dynamic subsidy mechanism when the subsidy rate is low,while the dynamic subsidy mechanism is more suitable when the subsidy rate is high.

关 键 词：政府补贴 订单农业 供应链融资 

分 类 号：F326.6[经济管理—产业经济] F812.8