双渠道医药供应链动态博弈策略研究——考虑医保政策和消费者偏好  

Research on Differential Game Strategy of Dual-channel Drug Supply Chain——Under Medical Insurance Policy and Consumer Preference

作　　者：褚皓月 温艳[1] 于溪源 CHU Hao-yue;WEN Yan;YU Xi-yuan(School of Business,Qingdao University,Qingdao 266071,China)

机构地区：[1]青岛大学商学院,青岛266071

出　　处：《青岛大学学报（自然科学版）》2022年第4期73-80,共8页Journal of Qingdao University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(批准号:71771129)资助;山东省自然科学基金(批准号:ZR2019MG001)资助;青岛市博士后应用研究项目(批准号:40518060048)资助。

摘　　要：针对医保政策和消费者渠道偏好影响下的双渠道医药供应链最优决策问题,采用微分博弈理论,构建了由单一医药制造商与单一医药零售商构成的双渠道医药供应链系统,研究Nash非合作博弈、Stackelberg博弈和协同合作博弈三种微分博弈情形下成员最优策略、最大利润以及供应链整体绩效情况。研究结果表明,医药制造商提高药品质量水平、医药零售商加大促销投入均可提升品牌商誉,保证自身利润增长;医药供应链各成员及供应链总利润与医保报销比例呈正比,消费者对线下渠道偏好程度越高,医药零售商和供应链总利润越高;协同合作能激励医药制造商改善药品质量,激励零售商加大促销努力,使医药供应链整体绩效最优,是医药行业的最佳运作模式。For making the optimal decision of dual-channel drug supply chain under the influence of medical insurance and consumer channel preference,a two-channel drug supply chain system composed of a drug manufacturer and a drug retailer was constructed based on differential game theory.The optimal strategy,maximum profit and overall performance of supply chain are studied under Nash non-cooperative game,Stackelberg game and cooperative game.The research shows that brand goodwill and profit will increase with the improvement of drug quality of drug manufacturers and the increase of promotional investment of drug retailers;the profit of each member and the total profit of the supply chain are directly proportional to the proportion of medical insurance reimbursement,and the higher the degree of consumers’preference for traditional channel,the higher the total profit of drug retailer and supply chain;as the best operation mode of drug industry,cooperative game can improve the quality of drug manufacturer,increase the promotion efforts of retailers,and optimize the overall performance of drug supply chain.

关 键 词：医保政策 消费者偏好 品牌商誉 双渠道医药供应链 微分博弈 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]