如何有效获取专家建议——基于序贯委托代理模型  

How to Effectively Get Advice from Expert:A Model Based on Sequential Principal-agent Pairs

作　　者：鄢姣 尹训东 卢远瞩 YAN Jiao;YIN Xun-dong;LU Yuan-zhu

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学经济学院 [2]中央财经大学中国公共财政与政策研究院 [3]北京科技大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《中央财经大学学报》2023年第1期81-91,共11页Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“家庭教育投资不平衡的竞争性机制研究”(项目编号:20BJL148)。

摘　　要：本文构建序贯行动的两组委托代理模型,研究委托人利用专家建议进行风险决策的问题。考虑委托人依据专家代理人的信号评估决策风险,两个委托人可以互相进行交叉信息检验。当第一个委托人所得信息是私密或公开时,分别研究两个委托人对各自专家的最优激励合同。结果发现,相比于单个委托代理情形,无论第一个信号是私密或公开,第一个委托人利用交叉信息检验可以降低支付给专家的信息租金,同时他有动机隐瞒其所获得的信息。在私人信息下两个委托人是对称的,而在公开信息下,第二个委托人雇用专家的条件会更加苛刻,相应地雇用后预期支付租金更高。We consider a model where there are two principal-agent pairs who move sequentially.The principals rely on the agents to gather signals and offer advice before making a business decision.Two principals can cross-check his expert’s signal using the other signal.We study the principals’ optimal design of incentive contracts, when the first pair’s signal is public or private.We find the leader principal has incentive to hide his expert’s signal in order to utilize the follower’s outcome to cross-check his agent’s report and that would reduce the information rent given to the first expert.The two principals are symmetric when the first expert’s signal is private.When the first expert’s signal is public, the condition for the second principal to hire his expert would be more strict.He would pay more information rent to the second expert.

关 键 词：委托代理 信息租金 激励合同 

分 类 号：F062.5[经济管理—政治经济学] F016