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作 者:孙立恒 卢凌[1,2] 占慧莲 SUN Li-heng;LU Ling;ZHAN Hui-lian(School of Management,Jiujiang University,Jiujiang 332005)
机构地区:[1]九江学院管理学院 [2]江西财经大学
出 处:《财务与金融》2022年第6期74-80,共7页Accounting and Finance
基 金:中国博士后基金面上项目“公司治理、上市企业连续违规与企业生存分析”(2020M682104)阶段成果。
摘 要:本文基于中国2008-2018年上市公司的数据,采用倾向得分匹配法(PSM)和熵平衡匹配法(entropy balancing)考察了异质机构投资者与公司债权代理成本的关系。研究发现:当上市公司前十大股东中有机构持股且其持股规模较大时,机构投资者能够参与公司治理并减少公司债权代理成本;当机构投资者持股比例较小时,则不具有公司治理作用,对公司债权代理成本影响不大;机构投资者的治理作用在不同类型的公司中同样具有差异性,机构投资者在规模较小的公司中能够更好地发挥作用。Based on the data of listed companies in China from 2008 to 2018,this paper uses the Propensity Matching Scoring Method(PSM)and Entropy Balancing Method to investigate the relationship between heterogeneous institutional investors and the cost of corporate debt agency.The results show that:when the top ten shareholders of listed companies have institutional shareholding and their shareholding scale is large,institutional investors can participate in corporate governance and reduce the cost of corporate debt agency;When the shareholding ratio of institutional investors is small,it has no corporate governance effect and has little influence on the cost of corporate debt agency.The governance role of institutional investors is also different in different types of companies,and institutional investors can play a better role in smaller companies.
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