共同机构所有权与公司股价崩盘风险:促进还是抑制  

Common Institutional Ownership and the Stock Price Crash Risk: Promotion or Inhibition

作　　者：吴春贤[1] 邓玮民 Wu Chunxian;Deng Weimin

机构地区：[1]石河子大学经济与管理学院,新疆石河子832003

出　　处：《金融理论与实践》2022年第12期91-104,共14页Financial Theory and Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(72103144);石河子大学青年创新拔尖人才项目(CXBJ202210)、石河子大学高层次人才科研启动资金项目(RCSK2018C10);石河子大学2020年度自主资助支持校级科研立项项目(ZZZC202040A)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：防范化解股价崩盘风险是学术界持续关注的热点,针对共同机构所有权这一股权结构特征,以2007—2020年A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了共同机构所有权对股价崩盘风险的影响。研究发现具有共同机构所有权的公司能够有效抑制股价崩盘风险,支持了“协同治理假说”。在使用Heckman二阶段、PSM-DID方法控制内生性问题进行稳健性检验后,以上结论依然成立。机制检验发现,信息透明度与公司治理水平在共同机构所有权与股价崩盘风险之间具有部分中介效应,且共同机构大股东抑制股价崩盘风险的效果在国企及集中度高的企业中更显著,更能发挥其治理作用。Preventing and resolving the stock price crash risk is a hot topic in the academic circles.This paper empirically tests the impact of common institutional ownership on the stock price crash risk based on the ownership structure of common institutions, taking A-share listed companies from2007 to 2020 as samples. The study found that companies with common institutional ownership can effectively curb the stock price crash risk, which supports the “collaborative governance hypothesis”. The above conclusion is still valid after using Heckman two-stage, PSM-DID method to control endogenous problems and other robustness tests. Mechanism test shows that information transparency and corporate governance have a partial intermediary effect between the ownership of common institutions and the stock price crash risk. Moreover, the effect of controlling the stock price crash risk by major shareholders of common institutions is more significant when the competition between state-owned enterprises and product markets is low, and can play a more governance role.

关 键 词：共同机构所有权 股价崩盘风险 信息透明度 公司治理 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学]