中国绿色增长政策执行阻滞博弈模型研究  

Game Model of Green Growth Policy Implementation Block in China

作　　者：周英男[1] 黄赛 杨丹[1] ZHOU Ying-nan;HUANG Sai;YANG Dan(School of Economics and Management,Dalian University of Technology,Dalian 116024,China)

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学经济管理学院,辽宁大连116024

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2022年第12期1-8,共8页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重大国际(地区)合作研究项目(71320107006);国家社科基金后期资助项目(21FGLB094);辽宁省哲学社会科学规划基金项目重点项目(L21AGL005)。

摘　　要：中国绿色增长政策在执行过程中受到多方利益群体影响。本研究综合考虑环境税率、消费者绿色度支付系数和企业污染治理率等因素,建立政策社群、府际网络和生产者网络绿色增长政策执行阻滞优化决策及博弈模型,并通过数值仿真模拟参数变化。结果表明:环境税率需要控制在合理范围内,高税率将会增加来自生产者网络的政策执行阻滞;消费者绿色度支付系数能够有效降低政策执行阻滞;企业污染治理率提高将会增加政策社群和府际网络的政策执行阻滞。各级行动者可以通过调整环境税率、消费者绿色度支付系数和企业污染治理率,使得绿色增长政策执行过程趋于最优。The green growth policy in China is affected bymulti-stakeholder groups in the process of implementation. Considering environmental tax rate, consumer green degree payment coefficient and corporate pollution control rate, this paper establishes optimal decisions and game model of policy community, government network and producer network green growth policy implementation and builds a numerical simulation. The results show the environmental tax rate needs to be controlled within a reasonable range. The high tax rate will increase from the producer network policy implementation block. And consumer green degree of payment coefficient can effectively reduce the policy implementation block. Enterprise pollution control rate will increase the policy Community and intergovernmental network policy implementation block. Policy makers can adjust the environmental tax rate, consumer green degree of payment coefficient and corporate pollution control rate, so as to make the green growth policy implementation process tend to be optimal.

关 键 词：绿色增长政策 执行阻滞 博弈模型 

分 类 号：F205[经济管理—国民经济]