数据池共享行为的竞争风险与规制路径  

Competition Risk and Regulation Path of Data Pool Sharing Behavior

作　　者：陈肖盈 景沛梁 Chen Xiaoying;Jing Peiliang(School of Economic Law,East China University of Political Science and Law,Shanghai 200042,China)

机构地区：[1]华东政法大学经济法学院,上海200042

出　　处：《科技与法律（中英文）》2022年第6期46-53,共8页Science Technology and Law（Chinese-English Version）

摘　　要：数据池是数字经济时代数据共享的新产物,有利于提高数据交流效率、优化资源配置、促进创新,但如果利用不当也可能带来构筑过高市场壁垒、促成垄断协议、抑制创新、损害社会福利等风险。面对算法驱动下数据池共享行为所具有的隐蔽性增强、意思联络弱化的特点,反垄断法中传统的垄断协议分析理论在适用上陷入协同行为认定存在障碍、默示共谋分析框架缺失的规制困境。作为应对,通过对数据池共享行为中竞争要素的厘清、垄断协议意思联络要件的破除以及大数据监管模式的构建,有助于确保数据池共享行为的价值发挥与风险防范,以推动数字经济高质量发展。Data pool is a new product of data sharing in the era of digital economy,which is beneficial to improve the efficiency of data exchange,optimize the allocation of resources and promote innovation.However,if it is not used prop⁃erly,it may also bring risks such as building excessive industry barriers,facilitating monopoly agreements,inhibiting innovation and damaging social welfare.Faced with the characteristics of enhanced concealment and weakened mean⁃ing connection of algorithm-driven data pool sharing behavior,the traditional monopoly agreement analysis theory of antitrust law falls into a regulatory dilemma in the application of collaborative behavior identification obstacles and the absence of the analysis framework of implied collusion.In response,it is helpful to ensure the value play and risk pre⁃vention of the sharing behavior of data pool by clarifying the competitive elements in the sharing behavior of data pool,removing the connection elements of monopoly agreement and constructing the big data supervision mode,so as to pro⁃mote the high-quality development of digital economy.

关 键 词：数据池 数据共享 垄断协议 协同行为 默示共谋 

分 类 号：F49[经济管理—产业经济] D922.294[政治法律—经济法学]