民营企业的高经济地位是否有助于减少监管处罚?——来自沪深交易所纪律处分的证据  

Will the High Economic Status of Private Enterprises Contribute to Reducing Regulatory Penalties Evidence from the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange's Disciplinary Actions

作　　者：余玉苗[1] 陈籽宏 Yumiao Yu;Zihong Chen

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院会计系

出　　处：《会计论坛》2022年第1期1-18,共18页Accounting Forum

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(72072133、71672131)。

摘　　要：在监管转型背景下,证券交易所一线监管的功能得到进一步强化。上市民营企业在地方经济发展过程中扮演着重要角色,地方政府往往会为它们提供一定程度的保护。本文以2007~2019年沪深A股上市民营企业为研究对象,实证检验了民营企业的经济地位与交易所纪律处分的关系。研究结果表明,民营企业经济地位越高,越不容易受到交易所纪律处分,受到纪律处分的程度也越低。此外,董事长或总经理的政治关联会削弱企业经济地位对交易所纪律处分的影响。进一步研究发现,在存在财政压力和市场化程度较低的地区,经济地位对民营企业受到交易所纪律处分的影响更为显著。本文的研究结果对深化市场体制改革、提升证券监管的治理效果具有重要的启示意义。The role of frontline regulation of the exchanges has been further strengthened under the background of regulatory transformation.Listed private enterprises play an important role in the development of the local economy,so the local governments often provide them with a certain degree of protection.This article is to test the impact of the economic status of private enterprises on the exchange's disciplinary actions with the sample of A-share private enterprises from 2007 to 2019.The result shows that,the higher the economic status of private enterprises,the less likely they are to be punished by the exchange and the lower the level of the exchange's disciplinary actions.What's more,the political connections of the chairman or CEO will reduce the impact of the economic status of private enterprises on the exchange's disciplinary actions.Further research shows that economic status has a more significant impact on the exchange's disciplinary actions in areas with financial pressure and low marketization.The article has some important enlightenment for deepening the reform of the market system and improving the governance effect of securities supervision.

关 键 词：交易所纪律处分 企业经济地位 上市民营企业 地方政府保护 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F276.5