可信执行环境软件侧信道攻击研究综述  

Survey on Software Side-channel Attacks in Trusted Execution Environment

作　　者：杨帆 张倩颖[1,2,3] 施智平 关永[1,5] YANG Fan;ZHANG Qian-Ying;SHI Zhi-Ping;GUAN Yong(College of Information Engineering,Capital Normal University,Beijing 100048,China;Beijing Engineering Research Center of High Reliable Embedded System(Capital Normal University),Beijing 100048,China;State Key Laboratory of Computer Architecture(Institute of Computing Technology,Chinese Academy of Sciences),Beijing 100190,China;Beijing Key Laboratory of Electronic System Reliability Technology(Capital Normal University),Beijing 100048,China;Beijing Advanced Innovation Center for Imaging Theory and Technology(Capital Normal University),Beijing 100048,China)

机构地区：[1]首都师范大学信息工程学院,北京100048 [2]高可靠嵌入式系统北京市工程研究中心(首都师范大学),北京100048 [3]计算机体系结构国家重点实验室(中国科学院计算技术研究所),北京100190 [4]电子系统可靠性技术北京市重点实验室(首都师范大学),北京100048 [5]北京成像理论与技术高精尖创新中心(首都师范大学),北京100048

出　　处：《软件学报》2023年第1期381-403,共23页Journal of Software

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(61802375,61602325,61876111,61877040);北京市教委科技计划一般项目(KM201910028005);中国科学院计算技术研究所计算机体系结构国家重点实验室开放课题(CARCH201920);交叉科学研究院项目(19530012005)。

摘　　要：为保护计算设备中安全敏感程序运行环境的安全,研究人员提出了可信执行环境(TEE)技术,通过对硬件和软件进行隔离为安全敏感程序提供一个与通用计算环境隔离的安全运行环境.侧信道攻击从传统的需要昂贵设备发展到现在仅基于微体系结构状态就能通过软件方式获取机密信息的访问模式,从而进一步推测出机密信息.TEE架构仅提供隔离机制,无法抵抗这类新出现的软件侧信道攻击.深入调研了ARM TrustZone、Intel SGX和AMD SEV这3种TEE架构的软件侧信道攻击及相应防御措施,并探讨其攻击和防御机制的发展趋势.首先,介绍了ARM TrustZone、Intel SGX和AMD SEV的基本原理,并详细阐述了软件侧信道攻击的定义以及缓存侧信道攻击的分类、方法和步骤;之后从处理器指令执行的角度,提出一种TEE攻击面分类方法,利用该方法对TEE软件侧信道攻击进行分类,并阐述了软件侧信道攻击与其他攻击相结合的组合攻击;然后详细讨论TEE软件侧信道攻击的威胁模型;最后全面总结业界对TEE软件侧信道攻击的防御措施,并从攻击和防御两方面探讨TEE软件侧信道攻击未来的研究趋势.In order to protect the security of the execution environment of security-sensitive programs in computing devices,researchers have proposed the trusted execution environment(TEE)technology,which provides security-sensitive programs with a secure execution environment isolated from the rich computing environment by hardware and software isolations.Side-channel attacks have evolved from traditional attacks requiring expensive equipment to now attacks using software to infer confidential information from its access mode obtained through microarchitecture states.The TEE architecture only provides an isolation mechanism and cannot resist this kind of emerging software side-channel attacks.This study thoroughly investigates the software side-channel attacks and corresponding defense mechanisms of three TEE architectures:ARM TrustZone,Intel SGX,and AMD SEV,and discusses the development trends of the attacks and defense mechanisms.First,this study introduces the basic principles of ARM TrustZone,Intel SGX,and AMD SEV,and then elaborates on the definition of software side-channel attacks and the classification,methods,and steps of cache side-channel attacks.Second,from the perspective of processor instruction execution,a TEE attack surface classification method is proposed to classify TEE software side-channel attacks,and the attacks combining software side-channel attacks and other attacks are explained.Third,the threat model of TEE software side-channel attacks is discussed in detail.Finally,the industry’s defense mechanisms against TEE software sidechannel attacks are comprehensively summarized,and some future research trends of TEE software side-channel attacks are discussed from two aspects:attack and defense.

关 键 词：可信执行环境(TEE) 隔离架构 ARM TrustZone Intel SGX AMD SEV 软件侧信道攻击 

分 类 号：TP309[自动化与计算机技术—计算机系统结构]