企业创新的专有性信息传递困境与纾解——基于审计师选聘视角的分析  

The Dilemma and Alleviation of Firm Innovation Proprietary Information Dissemination:Based on the Perspective of Auditor Choice

作　　者：郑军 林钟高 贺建刚 ZHENG Jun;LIN Zhonggao;HE Jiangang(School of Accountancy,Nanjing University of Finance&Economics,Nanjing 210023 China;School of Business,Anhui University of Technology,Maanshan 243032,China;School of Social Audit,Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing 211815,China)

机构地区：[1]南京财经大学会计学院,江苏南京210023 [2]安徽工业大学商学院,安徽马鞍山243032 [3]南京审计大学社会审计学院,江苏南京211815

出　　处：《中南财经政法大学学报》2023年第1期37-51,共15页Journal of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“供应商—客户关系对审计师风险应对策略的影响机理研究:基于产品特性视角”(19YJC790198);国家自然科学基金项目“不确定性摩擦与会计信息有用性研究:基于投资信息观框架”(72272077);国家自然科学基金项目“基于企业集团视角非金融企业杠杆背离的机理分析与对策研究”(72272073);安徽省高校科学研究项目“政府采购制度改革对企业绿色技术创新的影响研究:基于政府大客户—供应商关系的传导效应”(2022AH051269)。

摘　　要：披露创新活动信息是企业彰显研发技术优势和获取投资者认同的重要方式,但同时也会因为泄露研发知识和技术细节而引致专有成本,这使得企业在有效揭示和传递创新专有性信息时遭遇两难抉择。本文以2007—2018年A股上市公司为样本,考察企业是否会通过审计师选聘来纾解创新专有性信息传递的困境。研究发现,创新产出越多和创新效率越高的企业,越偏好选聘研发审计专长水平更高的本地审计师。进一步研究表明,当企业创新产出的独特性强、可验证性弱、创新价值被低估以及创新披露专有成本大时,这种偏好表现得更加明显。此外本文还发现,创新能力强的企业偏好选聘具有研发审计专长的本地审计师并非缘于降低代理成本和获取外部融资的需求所致,也并非由审计合谋动机所驱使,反而是本地审计师能有效遏制管理层研发费用操纵行为,并收取了更低的审计费用。本研究不仅丰富了企业创新活动信息传递与审计师选聘策略方面的研究,增补了审计师专长作用方面的文献,同时也为投资者有效评判企业创新信息和进一步推动资本市场支持企业创新发展提供参考。Disclosure on innovation activities information is an important way to show firms’ R&D technology advantages and enhance investors’ recognition, and it also leads to proprietary costs due to the disclosure of R&D knowledge and technical details, which makes firms in the dilemma when revealing and disseminating the propriety information of innovation activities. Based on using the Chinese listed firms from 2007 to 2018 as samples, the paper investigates whether firms will alleviate the dilemma of innovative proprietary information dissemination through auditor choice.The results show that the firms with higher of R&D innovation output and innovative efficiency prefer to choose local auditors with more R&D audit expertise, and the relationship is more pronounced when the firms with higher uniqueness of innovation output, weaker in verifiability of innovation output, the less information about innovation value, and higher propriety costs of innovation information disclosures.Finally, this paper finds that the firms with strong innovation ability preferring to choose local auditors with R&D audit expertise is not motivated by reducing agency costs or obtaining external finance, and those results are not derived from audit collusion, the local auditors constrain the manipulation of R&D costs, and charge lower audit fees.This study enriches the research on innovation information dissemination and auditor choice, expands the evidence of the role of auditor expertise, also provides reference for investors to effectively judge the firms’ innovation information and further promote the capital market to support the firms’ innovative development.

关 键 词：企业创新 专有性信息 审计师选聘 研发审计专长 

分 类 号：F239[经济管理—会计学]