Competition vs cooperation:renewable energy investment under cap-and-trade mechanisms  

作　　者：Wei Chen Jing Chen Yongkai Ma 

机构地区：[1]College of Management Science,Chengdu University of Technology,Chengdu 610059,China [2]Rowe School of Business,Dalhousie University,Halifax,NS B3H 4R2,Canada [3]School of Management and Economics,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China,Chengdu 611731,China

出　　处：《Financial Innovation》2022年第1期2079-2106,共28页金融创新（英文）

基　　金：support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.71531003);Philosophy and Social Science Research Fund of Chengdu University of Technology(YJ2021-QN005);Center for Trans-Himalaya Studies(KX2022B01)。

摘　　要：This paper explores the incentives of investment in renewable energy of two utility firms who compete or cooperate under either a cap-and-trade grandfathering mechanism(GM)or benchmarking mechanism(BM).We find that utility firms will invest in renewable energy more under BM than under GM,in both competitive and cooperative markets,and they will invest more in a competitive market than in a cooperative market,under either GM or BM.Furthermore,utility firms will produce more electricity and generate more total carbon emissions under BM than under GM.The profits of two firms,however,are higher in cooperative market than in competitive market.The government will benefit from implementing a BM to encourage utility firms to invest in renewable energy in a competing market.

关 键 词：Cap-and-trade mechanism Renewable energy investment Competitive market Cooperative market 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]