A self-employed taxpayer experimental study on trust,power,and tax compliance in eleven countries  

作　　者：Larissa M.Batrancea Anca Nichita Ruggero De Agostini Fabricio Batista Narcizo Denis Forte Samuel de Paiva Neves Mamede Ana Maria Roux-Cesar Bozhidar Nedev LeošVitek József Pántya Aidin Salamzadeh Eleanya K.Nduka Janusz Kudła Mateusz Kopyt Luis Pacheco Isabel Maldonado Nsubili Isaga Serkan Benk Tamer Budak 

机构地区：[1]Department of Business,Babeş-Bolyai University,7 Horea Street,400174 Cluj-Napoca,Romania [2]Faculty of Economics,“1 Decembrie 1918”University of Alba Iulia,15-17 Unirii Street,510009 Alba Iulia,Romania [3]Department of Psychol-ogy,University of York,Heslington,York YO105DD,UK [4]BPP Education Group,Department of Psychology,School of Business,BPP University,137 Stamford Street,London SE19NN,UK [5]Department of Computer Science,IT University of Copenhagen,Rued Langgards Vej 7,2300 Copenhagen,Denmark [6]Office of CTO,GN Audio As(Jabra),Lautrupbjerg 7,2750 Ballerup,Denmark [7]Business Management Graduate Program,Strategic Finance Department,Mackenzie Pres-byterian University,163 Rua Maria Antônia,São Paulo 01302-907,Brazil [8]Center for Applied Social Sciences,Mackenzie Presbyterian University,930 Rua da Consolação,São Paulo 01302-907,Brazil [9]Department of Finance and Accounting,Faculty of Economics and Business Administration,Sofia University“St.Kliment Ohridski”,125 Tsarigradsko Shose Blvd.,Block 3,1113 Sofia,Bulgaria [10]Department of Public Finance,Faculty of Finance and Accounting,Prague University of Economics and Business,Winston Churchill Sq.,13067 Prague 3,Czech Republic [11]Department of Social Psychology,Institute of Psychology,ELTE Eötvös Loránd University,Egyetem tér 1-3,Budapest 1053,Hungary [12]Faculty of Manage-ment,University of Tehran,Jalal-Ale-Ahmad Street,Nasr Bridge,Tehran 1411713114,Iran [13]Department of Economics,University of Nigeria,Nsukka,Enugu State,Nigeria [14]Faculty of Economic Sciences,University of Warsaw,44/50 Długa Street,00-241 Warsaw,Poland [15]Department of Economics and Management/REMIT,Portucalense University,Rua Dr.António Bernardino de Almeida,541-619,4200-072 Porto,Portugal [16]School of Business,Mzumbe University,Mzumbe,P.O.Box 6,Morogoro,Tanzania [17]Department of Public Finance,Faculty of Economics and Administrative Studies,Inonu University,44280 Battalgazi,Malatya,Turkey [18]Department of Public Finance,Faculty of Economics,Administrative and So

出　　处：《Financial Innovation》2022年第1期2588-2610,共23页金融创新（英文）

基　　金：funded through the following research grants:Czech Science Foundation Project No.18-14082S;Uni-versity of Economics(Prague),Faculty of Finance and Accounting VSE Project No.IP 100040;Science without Borders program no.229760/2013-9(CNPq—Brazilian National Council for Scientific and Technological Development);CAPES-PrInt Project No.88887.310237/2018-00“Cérebro,Cognição e Comportamento:Teoria e Aplicação para Inovação em Negócios”.

摘　　要：The slippery slope framework explains tax compliance along two main dimensions,trust in authorities and power of authorities,which influence taxpayers’compliance attitudes.Through frequentist and Bayesian analyses,we investigated the framework’s assumptions on a sample of 2786 self-employed taxpayers from eleven post-communist and non-post-communist countries doing business in five economic branches.After using scenarios that experimentally manipulated trust and power,our results confirmed the framework’s assumptions regarding the attitudes of the self-employed taxpayers;trust and power fostered intended tax compliance and diminished tax evasion,trust boosted voluntary tax compliance,whereas power increased enforced tax compliance.Additionally,self-employed taxpayers from post-communist countries reported higher intended tax compliance and lower tax evasion than those from non-post-communist countries.Our results offer tax authorities insights into how trust and power may contribute to obtaining and maintaining high tax compliance levels amid global economic challenges,downturns,and increasing tax compliance costs.

关 键 词：Self-employed taxpayers Slippery slope framework Voluntary tax compliance Enforced tax compliance Tax evasion 

分 类 号：F812.42[经济管理—财政学]