董事高管责任保险提高了中国上市公司的企业价值吗?—基于2002—2018年A股上市公司非平衡面板数据的实证研究  

Does The D&O Insurance Enhance Firm Value of Listed Companies in China?

作　　者：许文彬[1] 江秀娟 XU Wen-bin;JIANG Xiu-juan(Department of Finance,School of Economics,Xiamen University,Xiamen 361005,China)

机构地区：[1]厦门大学经济学院金融系,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《数理统计与管理》2023年第1期158-174,共17页Journal of Applied Statistics and Management

摘　　要：作为化解现代企业代理问题的一种重要机制,董事高管责任保险在包括我国的许多国家都受到了相当的重视;但其是否有效提升了企业价值,无论在理论上还是实证上,都还未有定论。本文采用2002—2018年A股上市公司非平衡面板数据实证研究了董事高管责任保险对企业价值的影响,同时探究了该影响在不同的产权性质和不同的股权集中度下的差异,并以非效率投资为中介变量进一步探究了具体影响机理。论文认为:董事高管责任保险确实有助于提升企业价值,该作用是通过减少非效率投资实现的,国有产权性质和股权集中度的提高则会分别削弱该提升作用。论文最后据以给出了若干政策建议。Considered as an important mechanism to solve the agent problem in modern enterprises,the directors’and officers’liability insurance(D&O insurance)is put into effect in many countries,including China;but its effectiveness in enhancing firm value has not been proved,theoretically or empiricitally.The paper used unbalanced panel data of A-share market during 2012-18 to test the real influence of D&O insurance on firm value in China,and to explore the influence differentials under different property rights and different ownership concentrations,and then used unefficient investment as a mediating variable to probe into the influence mechanism.The results of the empirical study showed that D&O insurance did improve firm value in China’s listed companies,mainly through decreasing the scale of unefficient investment,but the state-ownership or a higher ownership-concentration would weaken the influence,which would lead to the ineffectiveness of D&O insurance.Since the state-ownership and/or high ownership concentration are inevitable in China,the actual function of D&O insurance is by far questionable.Some advises were given accordingly at the end.

关 键 词：董事高管责任保险 企业价值 非平衡面板数据 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学] O212[理学—概率论与数理统计]