政策试点何以悬浮?  

How does Policy Pilots Turn into Suspension:Based on Case Study of the Reform of Property Tax Pilots

作　　者：杨宏山[1] 张健培 Yang Hongshan;Zhang Jianpei

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学公共管理学院

出　　处：《治理研究》2023年第1期68-80,158,159,共15页Governance Studies

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“中国特色政策试验与政府间学习机制研究”(编号:19ZDA123);中国人民大学科学研究基金重大项目“政策试验模式的国际比较研究”(编号:20XNL022);中国人民大学科学研究基金项目“复杂型政策试验的运作过程与多重逻辑”(编号:22XNH041)。

摘　　要：中国改革伴随着大规模的政策试点,有些试点并未产生扩散效应,地方政府也不停止试点项目,致使试点在原地打转,形成独特的试点悬浮现象。地方改革者的政绩诉求、试点反馈的弱化效应、府际学习的抑制效应构成了试点悬浮的前提条件,试点地区的正当性诉求则是悬浮现象发生的根本原因。试点悬浮需要消耗行政资源,而有价值的知识生产处于停滞状态,无助于增进对不确定性的认知。提升试点驱动知识生产的有效性,既要提供非均衡的激励安排,激发地方政府的创新动力,也要改进试验设计和评估模式,提出框架性目标,设置时限要求,建立试点报告、同行评议和声誉激励制度。China’s reform has always been accompanied by large-scale pilot policies.For those pilot programs that had no diffusion effect,local governments would not stop them.As a result,these pilot programs go around in circles,forming a unique phenomenon of pilot suspension.This study proposes an explanatory framework that pilot suspension is the product of the combined effects of local reformers’ demands for political promotion,the self-weakening effect of pilot feedback,the restraining effect of inter-governmental learning,and the legitimacy of pilot decisions.Pilot suspension consumes administrative resources,and valuable knowledge production is stagnant,which does not help to improve perceptions of uncertainty.To improve the effectiveness of pilot-driven knowledge production,we should not only provide balanced incentive arrangements to stimulate innovation by local governments,but also improve pilot trial designs and evaluation modes,put forward framework goals,set time-limit requirements,and establish reporting,peer review,and reputation incentive systems.

关 键 词：试点悬浮 不确定性 政策反馈 同行评议 房产税试点 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学]