公司减资制度的缺陷与重构  

Defects and Reconstruct of Capital Reduction System

作　　者：皮正德 PI Zheng-de(School of Law,Tsinghua University,Beijing 100084,China)

机构地区：[1]清华大学法学院,北京100084

出　　处：《商业研究》2022年第6期134-144,共11页Commercial Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“公司资本制度再造与债权人利益保护研究”,项目编号:18BFX126;全国人民代表大会常委会法制工作委员会立法课题“公司资本制度再造与公司法的现代化”资助;中国法学会部级法学研究课题“公司法修订背景下股东治理协议制度构建”,项目编号:CLS(2022)C14;2022年度上海市哲学社会科学规划青年课题“公司合规机制的董事义务之维”资助。

摘　　要：公司减资是资本退出的重要通道之一,有重新配置社会资源的功能,守卫着债权人的债权安全。但是我国减资制度却存在明显的法律漏洞:不当减资的责任主体不明。这一漏洞在司法判例中并未得到妥善的解决,现有判例中的归责路径不但存在分歧,而且都难以适用于不当减资,有些判例甚至打破了股东与债权人之间的利益平衡,违背了公司有限责任的基本原则。基于典型案例所影射出的基础理论的分析,可以确定瑕疵减资的责任主体是减资股东,但是非减资股东与董事和高管也可能承担相应责任;同时,瑕疵减资责任的范围应当限于公司基于减资的实际支付;此外,减资制度也需要拓展对债权人事前披露的方式和内容,完善对基于减资支付的事中控制。Capital reduction is an important way of capital withdrawal.It functions for reallocating the resource of the society and guarding the security of creditor.However,there are obvious legal loopholes in our capital reduction system:nobody is responsible for misconduct in capital reduction.This loophole in the judicial precedent has not been properly resolved.The paths of attribution in existing jurisprudence are not only divergent,but also difficult to apply to misconduct in capital reduction.Some jurisprudence has even broken the balance of interests between shareholders and creditors and violated the basic principle of limited liability of the company.Based on the typical cases and the basic theory issues in them,it's not only the shareholder who reduced the capital should be liable for misconduct,the other shareholders,directors and executives should also be liable for misconduct.The obligation should be constrained to the actually payment from the corporation.It's necessary to augment the procedure and content of information disclosure before capital reduction and improve the control of payment based on capital reduction.

关 键 词：减资制度 法律漏洞 债权人保护 案例研究 责任承担 

分 类 号：D912.29[政治法律—民商法学]